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BRIDGING THE ENFORCEMENT GAP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: A CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURTS THEORY
THAT SELF-RESTRAINT PROMOTES FEDERALISM
ROBERT J. PUSHAW, JR.*
The Supreme Court has crafted numerous doctrines, such as
justiciability and abstention, that enable federal judges to decline
to exercise the jurisdiction Congress has granted them over all
constitutional cases. The result is that constitutional law is often
left to state judiciaries, which almost always have the last word
because Supreme Court review has become so rare. State judges
sometimes creatively expand or contract constitutional rights,
thereby producing enforcement gaps.
Although the Justices have tried to close some of these holes,
most remain unfilled. The Court has insisted, however, that its
jurisdictional rules of self-restraint promote the original understanding of federalism, which purportedly viewed state tribunals as
highly autonomous and as equal partners with federal courts in
enforcing federal constitutional law.
I will argue that, on the contrary, the Founders established an
independent federal judiciary to ensure the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law, not to carve out exceptions to federal
question jurisdiction that ultimately entrust such law to state
courts. I will further contend that, if the vast modern increase in
federal dockets has made it a practical necessity to create
restrictive jurisdictional doctrines, federalism suggests that such
limits should be imposed on controversies involving state law
(most obviously diversity), not cases arising under the Federal
Constitution.

* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale,
1988. I dedicate this article to the memory of Dean Timothy Heinsz, a dear friend and
trusted mentor. I will miss Tim's towering integrity, gentle spirit, kindness, sense of humor,
and wisdom.
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I. JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES AND FEDERALISM

A. The Mandatory Nature of FederalJurisdiction
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States" in one Supreme Court and any inferior
courts Congress establishes, with all federal judges guaranteed life
tenure and non-reducible salaries. Section 2 provides that "the
judicial Power shall extend" to two areas. The first is "all Cases"
involving certain subjects of peculiar national importance: federal
questions (those arising under the Constitution, Acts of Congress,
and treaties); admiralty; and cases affecting foreign ministers,
which raise delicate international law issues.' The second category
consists of "Controversies" between enumerated parties, such as
two states, a state and a citizen of another state, citizens of
different states, and a state (or its citizens) and a foreign nation (or
its citizens).2 Finally, Article III gives the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over "all Cases" affecting foreign ministers or state
parties, as well as appellate jurisdiction over "all the other Cases,"
subject to Congress's "Exceptions" and "Regulations."3
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Court has interpreted
Article III as granting Congress plenary control over federal
jurisdiction. In the seminal case of Ex ParteMcCardle,4 the Court
recognized absolute legislative discretion to make "Exceptions" to
its appellate jurisdiction.5 Similarly, the constitutional provisions
authorizing Congress to create inferior courts have long been read
as implying complete control over their jurisdiction.6 By combining
these two powers, Congress can remove the Court's appellate
jurisdiction and not assign that jurisdiction to lower federal courts,
effectively leaving the matter to state tribunals!7
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

4. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
5. Id. at 513-14.
6. The landmark decision is Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
7. See, e.g., Lockertyv. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943). I reject the "plenary power"
model and instead take the position that Congress can eliminate the Court's appellate
jurisdiction over Article III federal question "Cases" only if such jurisdiction is given to
inferior federal courts. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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Congress's plenary authority would be frustrated if federal
judges could ignore its statutory commands. In the memorable
words of Chief Justice Marshall: "We have no more right to decline
the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
[C]onstitution."' The Court has continued to cite this language of
absolute duty regarding jurisdiction.'
B. Doctrinesof JurisdictionalRestraint
Notwithstanding the foregoing precedent, the Court has also held
that Article III sometimes allows federal judges to decline their
federal question jurisdiction, particularly when doing so would
promote traditional principles of federalism.' 0 Examination of these
jurisdictional doctrines, however, raises serious doubts about their
fidelity to federalism as originally understood. 1
1. Justiciability
In the late 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt's judicial appointees, most
notably Felix Frankfurter, began to develop various "justiciability"
principles to determine the appropriate occasions for the exercise
of federal question jurisdiction. These doctrines rested on the
8. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). In this Essay, I will not
consider the second half of Marshall's equation: situations in which federal courts arguably
"usurp [jurisdiction] which is not given," such as pendent jurisdiction.
9. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817-18 (1976).
10. See infra notes 22-37, 41-52, 65-70, 74-75, 77-82 and accompanying text.
11. In this Symposium Essay, I can merely summarize these doctrines and the major
academic commentary on them. Two scholars deserve special acknowledgment for
systematically analyzing the myriad rules of judicial restraint in light of structural
constitutional principles such as federalism. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS
INTHE POLITICAL ORDER (1991) (arguing that the Court, by creating prudential doctrines like
abstention that enable federal judges to refuse to exercise their statutory federal question
jurisdiction, has violated its own-and constitutionally correct-tenet that all jurisdiction
conferred must be exercised); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543 (1985) (contending that courts have always inherently possessed reasoned
discretion to decide whether or not to assume jurisdiction based upon consideration of
federalism, comity, separation of powers, equity, and efficient judicial administration).
I have relied upon the work of Professors Redish and Shapiro in raising questions about
jurisdictional doctrines based upon federalism. Ultimately, however, I do not follow either
of their approaches. See infra Parts II, IV.
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debatable notion that Article III's extension of "judicial Power" to
"Cases" and "Controversies" had always confined the judiciary to
adjudicating live disputes between adverse parties with private law
interests at stake. 12 Most importantly, "standing" required constitutional claimants to demonstrate an individualized injury to an
interest recognized by the common law.13 In the early 1970s, the
Burger Court added two elements to standing: that the defendant
must directly have caused the plaintiffs injury and that the court
can remedy it.14 The injury, causation, and redressability requirements preclude a citizen or taxpayer from alleging generally that a
government official has disobeyed the Constitution; rather, this
violation must have caused a personal injury that is legally
cognizable.15
12. The seminal opinion laying out this position is Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 46070 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A majority of the Court endorsed this conception of
standing as an Article III requirement in Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432-35
(1952). Justice Frankfurter also applied his Article III rationale to ripeness in United Pub.
Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947).
Justice Frankfurter asserted that the justiciability doctrines were required by the
Constitution's text, history, political theory, and early precedent. See, e.g., Coleman, 307 U.S.
at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). On the contrary, the Court since its inception had
treated justiciability as a matter of equitable discretion, guided (but not dictated) by
constitutional structural principles such as separation of powers and federalism. See Robert
J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 393, 436-63, 494-95 (1996). Moreover, the early Court often decided cases
involving public rights, not merely private disputes. See id. at 438, 441, 445-46, 449, 481-83
(citing examples).
13. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-60 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460-64, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Although the Court denied general assertions of standing under both the
Constitution and the Administrative Procedures Act, it deferred to Congress's explicit grant
of a right to sue in a particular regulatory statute, even if the legal interest at issue had no
common law antecedent. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15
(1942) (Frankfurter, J.) (sustaining the Communications Act of 1934 provision giving citizens
standing to vindicate "the public interest in communications," even if they had no private
rights at stake). Absent such a specific statutory conferral of standing, however, the Court
demanded a showing of individualized private injury. See Tracey E. George & Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., How Is ConstitutionalLaw Made?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1265, 1285-86 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-19 (1973) (holding that a mother
did not have standing to demand the prosecution of her child's father for non-support because
such a criminal enforcement action would result in jailing the father, not in obtaining the
remedy she sought-payment of child support); see also Pushaw, supra note 12, at 475-76
(summarizing the development of these requirements).
15. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(rejecting the standing of citizens who alleged that the service of congressmen in the military
reserves ran afoul of the constitutional clause prohibiting legislators from simultaneously
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The New Deal Court also created the Article III doctrine of
"ripeness," which bars judicial review until the factual and legal
issues have been sufficiently developed.' 6 Ripeness addressed the
need to prevent premature judicial intervention into the proceedings of administrative agencies, which began to proliferate in the
17
1930s.

Finally, the Court borrowed from its standing and ripeness
rationales to conclude that Article III prohibited the decision of
"moot" cases (i.e., those in which the parties' dispute had ended).' 8
holding executive offices); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 166-79 (1974) (denying
standing to a taxpayer who claimed that a federal law authorizing secret CIA expenditures
violated the constitutional provision requiring Congress to account for all expenses).
16. For a brief history of ripeness, see Pushaw, supra note 12, at 494-96. I will focus here
on unripe constitutional challenges to regulatory statutes and proceedings, not claims that
an administrative agency has exceeded its statutory authority.
17. Congress recognized that its burgeoning regulatory legislation often forced Americans
to choose between either obeying a statute they thought was unconstitutional or violating
it and risking serious liability if it were upheld. See S. REP. No. 73-1005, at 2-3 (1934).
Therefore, the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 (DJA), ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202), authorized a plaintiff who could show an "actual
controversy" with a defendant who was credibly threatening to enforce such a law to obtain
a decision on its validity.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the DJA in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227 (1937). The Court then developed ripeness standards to help federal judges
determine when to issue declaratory relief. Early decisions relied upon Justice Frankfurter's
Article III rationale to avoid premature judicial review, particularly in constitutional
challenges to statutes. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 89-91 (holding
unripe federal employees' First Amendment attack on the Hatch Act, which banned them
from political campaigning, on the ground that the Act had not yet been applied to them and
hence that any opinion would be advisory and exceed Article III limits); Int'l Longshoremen's
& Warehousemen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954) (refusing to consider
resident aliens' challenge to an INS regulation that threatened their ability to work
seasonally in Alaska).
The Warren and early Burger Courts adopted a more candidly discretionary approach to
ripeness. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (holding that ripeness
entailed a prudential evaluation of "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration"); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 117 (1976) (ruling that a constitutional attack on a federal election law "is a question
of ripeness, rather than lack of case or controversy under Art. III"). Within a few years,
however, the Court reversed course and reasserted that ripeness was an Article III
requirement. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
162-64 (1987) (citing cases). More recently, the Court has reverted to treating ripeness as
discretionary. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-39 (1998).
18. This claim was first made in Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). See
Pushaw, supra note 12, at 490-93 (summarizing the major cases, and noting the Court's
inconsistency in insisting that mootness is an Article III jurisdictional mandate, yet
recognizing that the doctrine is flexible and subject to numerous exceptions).
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Previously, mootness had been treated as a matter of prudential
discretion.19
The Court has maintained that standing, ripeness, and mootness
defineo with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.
The several doctrines ...are "founded in concern about the

proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society." ... "All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III ...
to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less
relate ...
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and

prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government."20

19. See, e.g., Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653-58 (1895) (holding that an appeal seeking
the right to vote in a particular election was moot once the election had occurred); see also
Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability:The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 603 (1992) (arguing that mootness should be a discretionary rather than constitutional
matter).
Another justiciability doctrine limits the federal judiciary to deciding "legal" rather than
"political" questions. I will not discuss the political question doctrine at length because the
modern Court has asserted that it is not based on either Article III or federalism, but rather
on separation of powers (i.e., declining jurisdiction to avoid interfering with the rightful
constitutional prerogatives of Congress or the President). See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
192-237 (1962).

It is worth noting, however, that the Baker Court's characterization of the political
question doctrine as based entirely on separation of powers cannot be squared with many
previous cases in which the Court invoked this doctrine because of federalism concerns. See
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., JudicialReview and the Political Question Doctrine:Reviving the
Federalist"RebuttablePresumption"Analysis,80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1172-74, 1177-78, 1181,
1192-96, 1199-1201 (2002) (citingprecedent). Baker's creative reinterpretation of the doctrine
has allowed federal courts to intrude deeply into affairs previously committed to the states,
most notably legislative districting and apportionment. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v.
Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a ConservativeMirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 372-79
(2001). This pattern of interference indicates that Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per
curiam), which second-guessed a state's resolution of a controversy over its presidential
electors, was hardly the aberration that its critics have suggested. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Reply to ProfessorsKrent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (2001).

20. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (citations omitted); see also Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (2004) (quoting Allen). Although
Congress can assign jurisdiction as it sees fit, subject only to Article III limits, the Court
ultimately defines those limits. Thus, if the Court interprets Article III and separation of
powers as requiring doctrines like standing, ripeness, and mootness, it can strike down
statutes that ignore those constitutional principles without undermining its overarching
theory of plenary congressional control over jurisdiction. See supra notes 1-19 and
accompanying text; infra notes 26, 87-89 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, the Court itself has acknowledged that certain aspects of the justiciability
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As this quote illustrates, the Court's justiciability opinions have
focused primarily on separation of powers-specifically, avoiding judicial interference with the elected coordinate branches.
Nonetheless, the Court's vision of federal judges as uniquely limited
in our democratic system2 1 has significant implications for the
Constitution's other great structural principle, federalism.
As federal courts increasingly have invoked justiciability
doctrines in refusing to decide federal law cases, litigants have been
forced to go to state tribunals. State judges are not bound by Article
III and therefore can apply more lenient justiciability rules 2 2-for
doctrines reflect prudential judicial self-governance. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. A good
illustration is the ban against granting standing to third parties. See Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at
2309-12 (holding that a father who did not have custody of his daughter lacked prudential
standing to bring a federal suit on her behalf challenging the constitutionality of a public
school's policy requiring all students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance). Another example is
the Court's creation of numerous policy exceptions to mootness. See Pushaw, supra note 12,
at 490 (citing cases). These discretionary doctrines conflict with the Court's own rule that it
must exercise jurisdiction granted by Congress in conformity with Article III.
More generally, I have argued that modern justiciability rules are almost wholly
discretionary, with the only true Article III doctrines being the bans on formal advisory
opinions, non-final judgments subject to political branch review, and genuine political
questions (i.e., those committed by the Constitution to the elected branches for resolution).
See id. at 395-99,436-511. Thus, all of these doctrines, when invoked to deny federal question
jurisdiction, raise serious constitutional problems. See id. at 486-511; see also REDISH, supra
note 11, at 64, 88-109, 141 n.5 (contending that justiciability principles are not Article III
requirements but rather are judge-made limits on the federal courts' mandatory statutory
jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional questions, and therefore violate separation of
powers).
21. Unfortunately, the Court has inverted the original understanding, for reasons I have
detailed elsewhere. See Pushaw, supra note 12, at 397-99, 412-35, 451-52, 455. To
summarize, the Framers and Ratifiers based the Constitution upon the sovereignty of "We
the People," who delegated certain powers to their legislative, executive, and judicial agents.
Hence, all government officials are constitutionally limited, and federal courts have power
coextensive with-not inferior to-that of Congress and the President. Moreover, federal
judges are not "unrepresentative" because they are "unelected." Rather, they represent the
People indirectly by exercising judicial power and were removed from electoral politics
deliberately to guarantee their independence in upholding federal law, especially the
Constitution. Therefore, separation of powers demands that federal courts assert federal
question jurisdiction, unless Congress has attempted to require opinions that are advisory,
non-final, or political.
Other scholars have similarly maintained that the justiciability doctrines undermine the
Constitution's system of separation of powers and limited government by allowing
independent federal courts to abdicate their duty of exercising judicial review, which leaves
the political branches as the final interpreters of the constitutional limits on their own
power. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 11, at 3-7, 75-100, 103-09, 124-26, 131-39; ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 1-24, 86-105 (1987).

22. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) ("We have recognized
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instance, by allowing taxpayer standing2 3 and by deciding moot
cases that raise legal questions of great public importance. 24 The
state court can then assert jurisdiction and resolve all questions
presented, state and federal.2 5 When such state judgments have
been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, it has taken inconsistent
approaches.
Initially, the Court dismissed these cases on the logical ground
that they were still non-justiciable under Article III and that therefore jurisdiction was absent.2 6 Such dismissals left state court
opinions on federal constitutional law intact. Some state judges
exploited this insulation from review by creatively under-enforcing
or over-enforcing federal constitutional norms, depending upon
their ideology.27
often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state
courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of
justiciability even when they address issues of federal law...."). For an exhaustive summary
and trenchant analysis of state justiciability doctrines, see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts
and the "PassiveVirtues" Rethinking the JudicialFunction,114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001).
23. See, e.g., Doremus v. Bd.of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1952) (recognizing that New
Jersey, like many other states, permits taxpayers to challenge expenditures that allegedly
violate the federal Constitution, even though federal courts do not permit such standing).
24. For example, in DeFunis v. Odegaard,416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam), a state trial
court ruled that the University of Washington Law School's affirmative action program had
violated the federal Fourteenth Amendment rights of a white applicant, and ordered him
admitted. Id. at 314-15. The Washington Supreme Court found that the case, although
possibly moot because the student was attending law school and would be allowed to
graduate, fell within the exception authorizing decision of moot cases raising issues of"great
public interest." Id. at 315-16 (citation omitted). On the merits, the court reversed and
upheld the constitutionality of the law school's program. Id. at 315.
The U.S. Supreme Court stayed this judgment pending its final disposition, and later held
that the case was moot under Article III because a ruling adverse to the student would have
no effect, as he was in his third year and the law school intended to let him graduate. Id. at
315-20. The Court vacated the state court judgment and remanded. Id. at 320.
25. See supra notes 22-24.
26. In Doremus v. Bd. ofEduc., a New Jersey court issued a declaratory judgment that
taxpayers had standing under state law to bring a federal constitutional challenge to a state
statute providing for Bible reading in public schools, but then upheld the law on the merits.
342 U.S. at 430-32. The United States Supreme Court recognized the state judiciary's right
to decide the case under its own standing rules, but held that "because our own jurisdiction
is cast in terms of 'case or controversy,' we cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the
basis for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law without review, any procedure
which does not constitute such." Id. at 434. The Court dismissed the appeal for want of
jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiffs had no Article III standing because they had failed
to show a direct and particular financial injury flowing from the assertedly unconstitutional
practice. Id. at 434-35.
27. To illustrate, in Doremus the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a statute
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To curb such abuses, the Court ruled that dismissal of the appeal
would not bar the same parties from litigating the identical claims28
in a federal forum (for example, in a declaratory judgment action).
The Court justified this exception to the ordinary preclusive
effect of state court judgments on federal questions as necessary
to preserve the uniformity of federal law. 29 But this exception
effectively foisted federal justiciability requirements on state
tribunals that sought to render a binding decision on federal
questions, contrary to the Court's longstanding precedent that state
judiciaries had independent authority to fashion their own jurisdictional doctrines and then decide any federal issues presented.3"
In 1974, the Court tried a new tack: vacating and remanding
state judgments rendered in cases that would have been nonjusticiable under federal standards.3 ' Left unexplained was how a
court which lacked jurisdiction had the power to vacate. 2
authorizing Bible reading in public schools at a time when the U.S. Supreme Court appeared
to be moving toward a stricter interpretation of the Establishment Clause. See supra note
26. Another example is the Washington Supreme Court's decision of a moot case in the early
1970s sustaining the constitutionality of affirmative action, even though the U.S. Supreme
Court had avoided deciding this controversial issue. See supra note 24; see also William P.
Murphy, Supreme Court Review of Abstract State Court Decisions on Federal Law: A
JusticiabilityAnalysis, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 473, 488-89 (1981) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should preserve the uniformity of federal law by not permitting state courts to render
unreviewable, and possibly erroneous, decisions on federal questions).
28. The Court recognized this potential problem in the first case to confront this issue
squarely. See Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434 ("[Wle cannot accept ... as the basis for conclusive
disposition of an issue of federal law without [federal judicial] review, any [state court]
procedure which does not constitute" a justiciable controversy.). Later cases developed this
idea that a state supreme court's decision under such circumstances bound only judges in
that state, not their federal counterparts. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 621-23
(1989) (citing cases, but concluding that they had been wrongly decided).
29. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 42 n.13 (1974).
30. The Court eventually acknowledged this contradiction and abandoned its approach
of dismissing the appeal but leaving the parties free to pursue the same case in federal court.
See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 621-23.
31. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974).
32. This glaring flaw suggests that the analysis in DeFunis did not reflect any
fundamental rethinking about justiciability and federalism, but rather a desire to evade the
controversial issue of affirmative action. See id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]e should
not transform principles of avoidance of constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping
resolution of difficult cases."). Indeed, in later cases the Court resurrected the approach of
dismissing the appeal but leaving the state court judgment intact. See, e.g., Kansas Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 481 U.S. 1044 (1987).
Cases like DeFunis and Doremus illustrate that the Court developed justiciability
standards in part to duck review of thorny constitutional cases that fell within its otherwise
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In the 1989 case of ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,3 the Court admitted
its error and abandoned this practice:
If we were to vacate the [state court] judgment below on the
ground that respondents lacked federal standing when they
brought suit initially, that disposition would render nugatory
the entire proceedings in the state courts. The clear effect would
be to impose federal standing requirements on the state courts
whenever they adjudicate issues of federal law, if those judgments are to be conclusive on the parties. That result, however,
would be contrary to established traditions and to our prior
decisions recognizing that the state courts are not bound by
Article III and yet have it within both their power and their
proper role to render binding judgments on issues of federal law,
subject only to review by this Court.
In addition, we doubt it would be a proper exercise of our
authority to vacate the state court's judgment in these circumstances. It would be an unacceptable paradox to exercise
mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy"
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 272-80
(1990). Pursuant to legislation dating back to 1789, the Court had a duty to review judgments
of a state's highest tribunal that either struck down a federal statute or rejected a federal
challenge to a state law. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. Nonetheless,
the Court developed exceptions to this jurisdiction, such as the justiciability doctrines
described previously and the requirement that the federal question presented be
"substantial." See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922). In 1914, Congress expanded the
scope of appellate review to include discretionary certiorari jurisdiction over state judicial
decisions that either upheld a federal law or invalidated a state law on federal grounds. See
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. In 1988, Congress made virtually all of the Court's
appellate jurisdiction discretionary. See Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. Accordingly, the
Court no longer needs to rely on justiciability rules to decline to review state judgments
denying federal claims. See Fletcher, supra,at 279-80.
33. 490 U.S. 605 (1989). In that case, Arizona courts granted standing to taxpayers and
a teachers' association to claim that an Arizona law, under which the state leased mineral
lands to Asarco and others, violated a federal statute governing such leases. The Arizona
Supreme Court resolved this federal question by invalidating the state law, and the
defendants (the state and the lessees) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. Id. at
609-10.
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in the original state trial,
neither of the plaintiffs (the taxpayers or the association) had satisfied federal standing
requirements. Id. at 612-17. Yet he reaffirmed the state court's power to apply its own
justiciability rules and to render binding decisions on federal law as properly flowing "from
the allocation of authority in the federal system." Id. at 617. Ultimately, the Court concluded
that petitioners (defendants below) had Article III standing to invoke the Court's appellate
jurisdiction because the state court judgment had inflicted a direct, concrete injury to their
legal interests. Id. at 617-19, 623-24.
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jurisdiction to confirm that we lack it and then to interfere with
a State's sovereign power by vacating a judgment rendered
within its own proper authority.... We have no authority to grant
a writ only to announce that, solely because we may not review
a case, the state court lacked power to decide it in the first
instance.3 4

The Court further conceded that its other approach-dismissing the
appeal, but refusing to give preclusive effect to the state tribunal's
judgment on federal questions-similarly ran afoul of its ordinary
principles of judicial federalism by pressuring state judges to apply
federal justiciability standards.3 5
The Court therefore announced a new model of review: treating
a state supreme court's decision that adversely altered the legal
rights of a defendant as an "injury in fact" sufficient to confer
Article III standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, even though the
plaintiff below still did not have standing.36 Despite consistently
reaffirming ASARCO,37 the Court has never justified its departure
from the standing analysis it has applied in every other context,
which asks whether the plaintiff (not the defendant) has suffered
an actual injury in an out-of-court transaction."
But how can ordinary justiciability rules be twisted beyond
recognition if they are bedrock requirements of Article III subject

34. Id. at 620-21.
35. Id. at 621-24.
36. Id. at 617-18.
37. The most recent instance is Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 120 (2003).
38. The ASARCO approach cannot be reconciled with the Court's premise that
justiciability is a constitutionalrestriction on its jurisdiction. If an Article III court originally
had no subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a concrete "injury
in fact" as evidence of a genuine dispute, and no facts changed during the litigation process,
then logically the plaintiffs continued to lack standing on appeal and the federal court (the
Supreme Court) still had no jurisdiction. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 634-36 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the case should have been dismissed
for lack of standing because the state court's action adverse to defendants could not create
an Article III "injury" and thus did not cure the jurisdictional defect that had existed since
the outset: the challenged state government conduct did not actually and specifically injure
the plaintiffs); Fletcher, supra note 32, at 280-81 (stressing that at the appeals stage the
parties were no more adverse, and their dispute was no more concrete, than at the
beginning). In my view, the intervening legal decision against the defendant was doubly
irrelevant: A legaljudgment is not a "fact," and the Court's standing inquiry had previously
always focused exclusively on the plaintiff,not the defendant.
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matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived? 9 This question, and
the Court's more general failure to develop a coherent approach to
reviewing state judicial opinions on federal constitutional law
rendered in cases that would have been federally non-justiciable,
casts doubt on its underlying theory of federalism. 4' These uncertainties grow when we turn to abstention.
2. Abstention
The New Deal Court authorized federal district judges to use
equitable discretion to abstain from exercising their federal
question jurisdiction because of federalism concerns. In the landmark case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 41 the

commission ordered that railroad sleeping cars be operated by
conductors (all of whom were white) rather than porters (all of
whom were black). 42 A railroad company and its employees
complained in federal court that this order exceeded the commission's power under state law and also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43 The Supreme Court held that the district court
39. See ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 636 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (accusing the majority of distorting Article III jurisprudence to achieve the goal of
ensuring Supreme Court review of state decisions on federal questions, which the
Constitution does not require). The Court made a policy exception to its justiciability rules,
guided by general federalism principles of preserving its review of state judgments on federal
law. Although such a ruling is eminently defensible, the Court's refusal to admit explicitly
that it was acting on policy rather than constitutional grounds resulted in further analytical
confusion.
40. Several scholars have recommended that federal and state courts follow the same
justiciability rules in deciding federal question cases, thereby preserving the Court's vital
constitutional role in reviewing all federal law issues to ensure uniformity. See, e.g., Fletcher,
supra note 32, at 265, 282-304; Murphy, supra note 27, at 490-99. This proposal would
promote intellectual consistency and preserve the Court's appellate jurisdiction over all
federal law cases, but would allow violations of federal rights to go unremedied. Ideally,
federal judges would always adjudicate federal law claims, but if they decline to do so, it
seems better for a plaintiff to have a state court available than no court at all.
Professor Hershkoff rejects the idea that state judges should blindly follow federal
standards of self-restraint. See Herschkoff, supra note 22, at 1876-77. Instead, she urges
them to develop differing approaches to justiciability that reflect each state's unique
constitutional conception of the appropriate role of its judiciary vis-a-vis other government
institutions in addressing state and local needs. Id. at 1836-40, 1877-1941.
41. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
42. Id. at 497-98.
43. Id. at 498.
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should have stayed its hand until the Texas judiciary had decided
the dispute over the unclear state law, because a resolution
favorable to the plaintiffs would obviate the need for a federal
forum to decide the constitutional challenge." In his opinion,
Justice Frankfurter endorsed
a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system
whereby the federal courts, "exercising a wise discretion,"
restrain their authority because of "scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments" and for the
smooth working of the federal judiciary.... This use of equitable
powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the
need of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers."5
The Court also created two other major abstention categories.
First, it has required dismissal-and not merely postponementof constitutional challenges in federal court to state laws in
complex areas of great importance to the states where they have
provided for specialized decision-making tribunals, such as
energy46 and tax47 regulation. These decisions have reiterated
49
Pullman's federalism rationale.4" Second, Younger v. Harris
involved a defendant's request for a federal injunction against a
pending California criminal prosecution that allegedly violated his
First Amendment rights."0 The Court conceded that Section 1983
authorized such an injunction but carved an exception for ongoing
44. Id. at 498-502.
45. Id. at 501. Later cases clarified that the plaintiff could either (1) reserve the right to

return to the federal court for a decision on the federal question, or (2) voluntarily forego the
federal forum and submit all claims to the state court. See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd.of
Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 419-22 (1964).
46. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (dismissing a suit attacking an order
of a Texas Commission concerning the drilling of oil wells).
47. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)
(barring a damages action under § 1983 to remedy the allegedly unconstitutional
administration of a state tax system).
48. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 332-34 (citing Pullman and concluding that "a sound respect
for the independence of state action requires the federal equity court to stay its hand"); see
also McNary, 454 U.S. at 107-16 (emphasizing the longstanding principle of comity that
counseled against federal judicial interference with state tax systems).
49. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
50. Id. at 38-40.
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criminal trials.5 ' In his opinion, Justice Black stressed that the
traditional reluctance of equity courts to restrain criminal proceedings was reinforced by
the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up
of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of
the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways. This ... is referred to
by many as "Our Federalism." ... What the concept does repre-

sent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States.5 2
The abstention doctrines raise significant constitutional problems, which have been nicely catalogued by Professor Redish. 5 3
Most importantly, they conflict with the Court's longstanding
position that federal judges have a duty to exercise all jurisdiction
conferred by Congress.5 4 Congress has given federal district courts
original jurisdiction over all civil cases arising under federal law,
which may include both federal and state law questions.5 5 How can
the Court effectively amend that statute by creating abstention

51. Id. at 40-54.
52. Id. at 44. The Justices understandably sought to prevent defendants in state criminal
prosecutions from routinely running to federal courts to invoke the Warren Court's freshly
minted constitutional rights. Perhaps the Court should have frankly overruled or restricted
these cases, not suggested that "Our Federalism" requires federal judges to refuse to hear
constitutional claims as directed by Congress.
53. See REDISH, supra note 11, at 47-74. But see Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory
of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REv. 530 (1989) (rejecting Redish's thesis and arguing that the
abstention doctrines should be refashioned to balance explicitly the federal courts' competing
interests in protecting constitutional rights yet respecting state judicial authority).
54. See REDISH, supra note 11, at 47-51 (maintaining that a court may not repeal
jurisdictional grants by Congress unless there are constitutional objections); see supraPart
L.A (discussing the prevailing theory that federal court jurisdiction is mandatory).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993).
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doctrines, which either eliminate the federal trial forum 6 or delay
access to it until costly state court remedies have been exhausted?"
The Court's answer-that it is exercising "equitable discretion" in
light of federalism-begs the question of why its view of appropriate
federal-state relations should trump that of Congress.5 8 For
instance, Section 1983 and similar statutes reflect a considered
legislative judgment that plaintiffs should have the option of
bringing their federal constitutional claims before an independent
federal trial court with expertise in federal law, not state judges
who lack such attributes and who historically had proven themselves untrustworthy in such matters.5 9 In a case like Pullman,why
56. See supranotes 46-52 and accompanying text (describing the total abdication of the
federal judiciary in cases like Burford, McNary, and Younger).
Professor Friedman disputes that Younger necessarily has this door-slamming effect. See
Barry Friedman, Under the Law of FederalJurisdiction:Allocating CasesBetween Federal
and State Courts, 104 CoLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1249-53 (2004). Initially, he argues that a person
who believes that a state criminal law is unconstitutional should not violate it (which would
trigger the state's vital enforcement interest), but rather should obtain a declaratory
judgment in federal court. Id. at 1249-52. To the objection that such potential claimants lack
sufficient legal understanding to assert their rights in this way, Friedman responds that we
should presume everyone's knowledge of criminal law, that in any event potential
lawbreakers are often given warnings, and that they are often sophisticated and seek legal
counsel. Id. at 1251-52 n.115 and accompanying text. I would need to see empirical evidence
before accepting such claims, which conflict with my assumption that most people who
engage in criminal behavior are unsophisticated, are not in contact with lawyers, are
unlikely to be aware of the intricacies of federal jurisdiction, and are arrested without
warning.
Professor Friedman then contends that, after a defendant has been convicted and
sentenced in the state system, he can bring any federal claims in a habeas action in federal
court. See id. at 1232, 1253, 1261-63, 1274. But see id. at 1261-63 (acknowledging and
lamenting the gaps in habeas review, such as the ban on raising Fourth Amendment issues).
In my view, such a later collateral proceeding is an inadequate substitute for an initial
federal forum. The most obvious reason is that a successful habeas petitioner has been forced
to endure an unnecessary state criminal prosecution, which entails a substantial loss of
liberty, time, money, and reputation. See infra notes 59-61, 92, 231-34 and accompanying
text.
57. See supranotes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Pullman abstention).
58. See REDISH, supranote 11, at 47-60, 71-74. But see Shapiro, supra note 11, at 546-47,
550-52, 558-59, 564-66, 569-70, 579-85 (asserting that federal courts have always had
discretion to interpret jurisdictional statutes to make reasonable accommodations for state
interests).
59. See REDISH, supranote 11, at 4-6, 48, 50, 53, 56, 58-60, 66-74, 168 n.67 (amplifying
this point). The foregoing critique of the Court's treatment of federal question cases-that
federal judges should not impose their notions of federalism to negate congressionally
conferred jurisdiction-might plausibly be applied to all other jurisdictional categories,
including diversity. In theory, separation of powers arguably requires the exercise of all
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did the Court undermine that policy determination by forcing
victims of racial discrimination to go before elected judges in the
segregated state of Texas? It is insufficient to respond that
abstention merely postpones federal court decision, because civil
rights claimants are especially unlikely to have the resources
necessary to handle two separate trials.6 ° Thus, all non-wealthy
plaintiffs are often forced to forego the federal forum and litigate
both the state and federal issues in state court.6 '
Finally, in its abstention opinions, the Court has often reassured
us that federal constitutional rights will be protected because state
judges would fairly consider them and, if they erred, the Court
would be available to hear the appeal.6 2 But does such review
substitute for the original federal forum that Congress mandated?6 3
Even if it does, is such appellate jurisdiction a meaningful check on
state abuses, given that such review is now discretionary and the
64
Court has chosen to hear no more than a dozen such cases a year?

statutory jurisdiction, with Congress making adjustments in the event of an overload. See
id. at 47-139.
In practice, however, the Court concluded long ago that this scenario is unrealistic and
that it must create doctrines to trim federal dockets to manageable levels. See infra Part III.
To the extent that federalism informs this task, I submit that state-law diversity
"Controversies" should be cut back, not federal law "Cases." See infra Part IV.
60. Congress and commentators have recognized that civil rights plaintiffs are
disproportionately poor. See Note, Fee Simple: A Proposalto Adopt a Two-Way Fee Shift for
Low-Income Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231-41 (1988) (summarizing relevant
federal legislation and scholarship).
61. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 767, 772-74, 788-89 (4th ed. 2003);
Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 591 (1977).
Long after Pullmanhad been decided, federal courts received statutory authority to certify
contested questions of state law to the state's highest court, thereby minimizing delays and
costs. See Friedman, supra note 56, at 1214, 1229-30, 1254-56, 1278 (describing and
endorsing certification). Nonetheless, federal judges generally remain reluctant to certify.
See Guido Calabresi, Federaland State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1293, 1301-02, 1306-08 (2003) (criticizing this failure to use certification).
62. See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116-17
(1981); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
63. On occasion, the Court itself has recognized that the answer is no. See England v. La.
State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
64. See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twentyfirst Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 350-53 (2002) (documenting the Court's reduction of its
annual appellate docket of state judicial decisions from about 37 before the 1990s to about
7-12 in the late 1990s); see also Friedman, supra note 56, at 1218-20 (emphasizing the
inadequacy of Supreme Court review to safeguard federal interests).
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These unanswered questions invite skepticism about the Court's
assertion that abstention merely implements the design of the
original architects of "Our Federalism."
3. Other JurisdictionalDoctrines
The Court's "states' rights" vision of judicial federalism undergirds many other jurisdictional doctrines, which create further
gaps in enforcement of constitutional law. Although examples
could be multiplied, three are especially pertinent: the wellpleaded complaint rule, the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine, and sovereign immunity.
First, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,6 5 an
injured passenger sued a railroad in federal court for breaching a
contract to give her free lifetime passes, which was a state law
matter.6 6 She further alleged, in anticipation of the railroad's
defense, that a federal statute prohibiting such passes was
unconstitutional. 7 The Court held that no federal jurisdiction
existed because the federal question had to be raised in the plaintiff's properly pleaded cause of action, not in the defense. 8
This ruling seems counterintuitive, as a case "arising under"
federal law would appear to include one that depended upon the
interpretation of federal law, whether presented in the complaint
or the answer.6 9 Nonetheless, this "well-pleaded complaint" rule
quickly took root and has shunted many federal question cases to
65. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
66. Id. at 151.
67. Id. at 152-53.
68. Id. at 152-54.
69. For elaboration of this theme and a plea to abolish this rule, see Donald L.
Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just OurPolicy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint
Rule Sabotages the Purposesof FederalQuestion Jurisdiction,38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987).
By contrast, Judge Posner has argued that Supreme Court review works better than federal
district court original jurisdiction in dealing with federal law issues contained in a defense,
primarily because the Court can distinguish substantial federal questions from those artfully
pled to generate a basis for removal. See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 190-91 (1985). This contention had special force before 1988, when the Court had
a duty to hear appeals filed by a party whose federal defenses had been rejected by a state
tribunal. See supranote 32 (citing statute). Now that the Court's appellate docket is entirely
discretionary and the Justices have radically decreased their review of state judgments,
however, the well-pleaded complaint rule has become harder to justify. See supra notes 32
and 64 (discussing the Court's shrinking appellate caseload).
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state courts. 70 Again, losing defendants with federal constitutional
claims have been left with only the remote possibility of Supreme
Court review.
Second, in Murdock v. City of Memphis,7 1 the Justices declined to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over a state court judgment on state
law. 7 2 The Court correctly explained that it aimed solely to ensure
the supremacy and uniformity of federal law, and that each state's
judiciary had the final word on state law. 3 In a later case, however,
the Court announced it would dismiss even appeals that did raise
a contested question of federal law if the state court decision rested
on a state law ground that was "independent" of federal law and
"adequate" to sustain the outcome-in other words, reversing the
federal law ruling would not change the result.7 4 An example would
be a state conviction of a criminal defendant who had failed to
comply with the state's valid procedural rule requiring contemporaneous objection at trial to allegedly illegal evidence, and who
later claimed that this default infringed his federal constitutional
rights.7 5
The Court has justified this "adequate and independent state
grounds" doctrine as minimizing its interference with state court
decisions and as avoiding unnecessary constitutional rulings. Again,
however, this prudential doctrine leaves intact incorrect and

70. For reaffirmations of the rule, see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-32 (2002); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 9-22 (1983).
71. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
72. Id. at 618-38.
73. Id. at 626-36. The lone exception is that the Court can review a state court decision
that rests on an interpretation of state law that blocks consideration of a federal issue. See
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law
Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002) (summarizing these cases and proposing a "proven
mistrust" rule: that the Court can intervene only when it sets forth specific evidence that the
state tribunal consciously manipulated state law to frustrate federal law and avoid the
Court's appellate jurisdiction).
74. The seminal case articulating this "adequate and independent state grounds" rule is
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893). The Court has developed several exceptions to
preserve its opportunity for review. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375-88 (2002)
(reaffirming the general rule, but concluding that the case fell within a narrow exception
allowing review because the state court had relied on a procedural rule that effectively
deprived the defendant of his due process rights).
75. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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inconsistent state judicial interpretations of federal constitutional
law, thereby opening further holes in its enforcement.7 6
Third, state sovereign immunity has crippled full vindication
of constitutional rights. The Eleventh Amendment provides that
federal "judicial power" does not extend to any suit against a state
brought by citizens of another state. In the landmark case of
Hans v. Louisiana,"7 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits a citizen from suing a state in federal court for allegedly
violating federal rights.7" Seminole Tribe v. Florida79 established
that Congress cannot abrogate such immunity by exercising its
Article I powers (e.g., under the Commerce Clause). ° The Court
maintained that the Eleventh Amendment expressed the broader
"'postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of
sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent."''
When a plaintiff attempted to vindicate his federal statutory rights
by suing a state in state court (which the Eleventh Amendment
does not cover), the Court barred the action by invoking a global,

76. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal
JurisdictionalPolicy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Doctrine,86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291 (1986). These authors correctly reject the Court's assertion
that the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine is a jurisdictional restriction
imposed by Congress consistently with Article III, and instead characterize the doctrine as
a matter of prudential self-restraint to avoid intruding into state courts' legitimate domain.
See id. at 1292-1355.
Congress's decision in 1988 to make the Court's appellate docket discretionary (described
supra note 32) has lessened the impact of the "adequate and independent state grounds"
doctrine, because the Court now may simply decline review without providing any reason.
As a practical matter, then, the doctrine currently has force mainly when the Court wishes
to take jurisdiction because of some exceptional situation, as in Kemna.
77. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
78. Id. at 9-21.
79. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
80. Id. at 54-73. The Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment, ratified in 1793,
altered any power Congress may have had under the original Constitution to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Id. at 64-66. By contrast, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment made
an exception to the Eleventh Amendment by empowering Congress to enact legislation
(including laws authorizing private federal lawsuits) to vindicate federal rights against state
deprivations. See id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)).
81. Id. at 68 (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)
(footnote omitted)). The Court has extended this holding to rebuff congressional attempts to
authorize suits against states in other areas. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Bd.
v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-48 (1999) (patent infringement).
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nontextual rule of sovereign immunity supposedly derived from
originalist principles of federalism. s2
The dissenters in these cases, and many scholars, have exposed
the flaws in the majority's reasoning.8 3 For present purposes, the
salient point is that sovereign immunity renders the federal
courts incapable of fully remedying state violations of federal
constitutional law. " As with justiciability, the Court has made
exceptions to try to close the gap. 5 These exceptions, however, seem
82. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999). The Court again relied on "[t]he good
faith of the States" in assuming that they would "honor the Constitution" and federal laws.
Id. at 755. It is unclear why the Court clung to this assumption in a case in which Maine
invoked sovereign immunity to defeat a very compelling claim that the state had violated
federal employment laws.
83. The most systematic judicial critique is Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100-85 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Souter relied upon scholars who have demonstrated that the Court's
conception of state sovereign immunity has no basis in the Constitution's text, structure,
underlying political theory, or history. See id. at 110 n.8 (citing articles by Vicki Jackson,
Akhil Amar, William Fletcher, John Gibbons, and Martha Field).
I agree with those professors who have concluded that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to bar suits against states grounded solely in the diverse citizenship of the parties,
but not cases that also featured a separate basis of federal jurisdiction-specifically, that the
state had violated federal law. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1473-92 (1987); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretationof the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative Grant of JurisdictionRather than a
ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REV.
1889 (1983); see also James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory"
Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998) (arguing that the
Constitution and Eleventh Amendment incorporated not state sovereign immunity, but
rather a compromise whereby states had autonomy to manage financial obligations that
existed at the time they ratified the Constitution yet accepted federal limits on future state
fiscal policy); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (contending that the Court should closely
adhere to the language of the Eleventh Amendment because it is so precisely worded and
detailed, rather than interpret the Amendment expansively based on perceived background
principles such as broad state sovereign immunity).
84. For an eloquent explanation of this point, see Amar, supra note 83, at 1425-29, 147392.
85. Most importantly, a victim whose federal rights have been violated by a state can sue
a state official (as distinguished from the state itself), but only for prospective injunctive or
declaratory relief, not a monetary award. See Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,662-71 (1974). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment has long been
construed as inapplicable to state political subdivisions and municipalities. See Mount
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,279-81 (1977) (citing precedent
dating back to 1890). Such exceptions have led some scholars to claim that the negative
effects of Hans and its progeny have been overstated. See, e.g., Michael Solimine, Formalism,
Pragmatism,and the Conservative Critique of the Eleventh Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV.
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so strained and illogical as to call into doubt the underlying rule of
sovereign immunity and its federalism basis.8 6 Put bluntly, why
would the Framers draft a Constitution to combat state abuses
and defiance of national law under the Articles of Confederation,
then exempt states from compliance with the Constitution? This
unanswered, and seemingly unanswerable, question indicates that
sovereign immunity also is a matter of judicial discretion, not
constitutional compulsion.
In sum, the Court has fashioned numerous doctrines that allow
federal judges to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction to decide all
constitutional cases, based on its interpretation of Article III and
the original understanding of federalism. Unfortunately, these
doctrines have raised analytical problems that the Court has never
adequately resolved.
C. Scholarly Approaches
Nearly all legal academics have accepted the Court's teaching
that the Constitution grants Congress plenary power over federal
jurisdiction.8 7 Taking this position to its logical extreme, Martin
Redish argues that the Justices have violated Article III and
separation of powers by crafting prudential doctrines that allow
federal judges to refuse the jurisdiction that Congress has validly
granted.8 He rejects the Court's justification that it must sometimes exercise equitable discretion to promote harmony between
the federal and state judiciaries.8 9
1463, 1483-84 (2003).
86. See Amar, supra note 83, at 1473-84; see also CHEMERINSKY, supranote 61, at 409-62
(cataloguing the multiple exceptions and permutations of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence).
87. The list includes some of the most distinguished public law scholars of the past halfcentury. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 11, at 17-19; Paul M. Bator, CongressionalPowerover
the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1030-31, 1038-39 (1982); Gerald
Gunther, CongressionalPowerto CurtailFederalCourt Jurisdiction:An OpinionatedGuide
to the OngoingDebate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 898-915 (1984); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06 (1965); cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts:An Exercise in Dialectic,66
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953) (endorsing congressional control, with the caveat that
Congress cannot make exceptions to jurisdiction that would destroy the Court's "essential
role ...
in the constitutional plan").
88. See REDISH, supra note 11, at 3-7, 47-139.
89. See id. at 47-74. More recently, Professor Redish has acknowledged that the Court
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David Shapiro has attacked Redish's premise that statutory
jurisdiction must invariably be asserted.9" Rather, Professor
Shapiro argues that federal courts have always exercised reasoned
discretion to decline jurisdiction in appropriate cases to accommodate countervailing interests such as equity, federalism, comity,
separation of powers, and efficient judicial administration." He
does not, however, attempt to set forth specific principles of fedthat should guide the exercise of discretion over jurisdiceralism
92
tion.
has not accepted his argument and is unlikely to do so, and that therefore he would
recommend abstention as the best practical alternative in certain circumstances. Martin H.
Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposinga Zero Tolerance
Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1350, 1370,
1375-76 (2000). Specifically, he suggests that a federal court should abstain whenever it
refuses to enjoin a parallel state judicial proceeding in order to foster the important goal of
avoiding duplicative concurrent litigation in federal and state courts. See id. at 1361-76.
90. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 543-74.
91. See id. at 547.
92. Rather, he maintains that federalism concerns should continue to inform the exercise
of discretion, with particular standards to be worked out in common law fashion depending
on the facts and context. See id. at 581-85. For a similarly flexible and organic conception,
see Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction,85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (contending that federal jurisdiction reflects a
continuing dialogue between Congress and the Court over the appropriate contours of such
jurisdiction, which evolve along with ideas about the proper role of the judiciary in the
constitutional system).
In a recent article, Professor Friedman argues that jurisdictional doctrines have become
overly complex and uncertain because of the assumption that a case must be litigated in
either a federal court or a state tribunal. Friedman, supra note 56, at 1216-26. He criticizes
the Court's attempt to resolve the problems caused by such "either/or" thinking through two
untenable theories: that state judges are as sensitive to federal interests as their federal
counterparts (the "parity" thesis), and that Supreme Court review of state judgments
sufficiently preserves the supremacy and uniformity of federal law. See id. at 1218-26, 1248,
1259-60, 1275. Instead, Friedman recommends a "multijurisdictionar' approach: Cases
should proceed in both state and federal courts when both state and federal interests are
involved. Id. at 1226-79. He emphasizes that this approach already exists in several areas,
such as abstention, federal habeas review of state criminal convictions, and federal court
certification of state law questions. See id. at 1229-35. Friedman contends that this
multijurisdictional framework should be expanded and that federal judges should more
candidly engage in an interest analysis that balances competing federal and state concerns.
Id. at 1236-61.
I agree with Professor Friedman that the Court's rhetoric about parity and appellate

jurisdiction fails to grapple with significant holes in the interpretation and enforcement of
federal law. Furthermore, I find that his proposal intelligently blends a concern for
protecting the legitimate interests of state tribunals with the imperative of assuring
meaningful consideration of federal questions. Nonetheless, the costs of his
multijurisdictional solution may sometimes outweigh the benefits. For instance, someone
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To formulate such principles, it is helpful first to summarize the
major revisionist scholarship on Article III's text, structure, history,
political theory, and early precedent. Initially, Robert Clinton
resurrected an argument made by Justice Story in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee:9 3 that the Framers sought to require Congress to
allocate to the federal judiciary every "Case" and "Controversy"
listed in Article III, and hence that Congress could make exceptions
to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction only if that jurisdiction was given to an inferior federal court.94
Refining this idea, Akhil Amar has contended that the drafters
of Article III, by deliberately using the modifier "all" before "Cases"
but omitting it before "Controversies," created two jurisdictional
tiers.9 5 In the first, "mandatory" tier of "all Cases" defined by
subject matter, Congress "shall" (i.e., must) grant some federal
court jurisdiction, either original or appellate.9 6 By contrast, in the
second, "permissive" tier of "Controversies" defined by parties,
Congress may-but need not-confer such jurisdiction.9 7 Hence,
Professor Amar challenged the prevailing wisdom that Congress
can deprive the entire federal judiciary of jurisdiction over "all
Cases" raising federal questions.9"
subjected to an expensive, reputation-shattering state criminal conviction might not be
entirely pleased if a federal court in a subsequent habeas action concludes that the
prosecution had been unconstitutional. See supra note 56.
93. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
94. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Guided
Quest for the Original Understandingof Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984). A recent
study buttressed Clinton's thesis through a careful analysis of the records of the
Constitutional Convention. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power
Regardingthe JudicialBranch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75.
95. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-FederalistView of Article III: Separatingthe Two Tiers of
FederalJurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). Through a "Neo-Federalist" methodology,
Professor Amar aimed to recover the original meaning of the Constitution's language,
structure, and political theory based primarily upon evidence from the Philadelphia
Convention, the ratification debates, and early federal statutes and cases. He then sought
to apply these Federalist principles, with appropriate sensitivity to intervening legal and
political developments, to help solve modern constitutional problems. See id. at 207-09, 23031 n.86.
96. Id. at 209-12, 215-19, 229-34, 239-45, 255-69, 272.
97. Id. at 209-10, 221-30, 233-38, 247-59, 262-63, 266.
98. For a response to critics of Professor Amar's theory, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Congressional Power over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist
InterpretationofArticle III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847; see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:
ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authorityto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981) (arguing that various constitutional provisions and
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I adapted Amar's two-tier framework to explore the federal
courts' role after Congress has granted them jurisdiction.99 My
central conclusion was that Article III's distinction between "Cases"
and "Controversies" denoted the different principal function that
federal judges were expected to perform: expounding laws having
national importance in "Cases," while acting primarily as neutral
umpires in resolving "Controversies," which typically involved state
substantive law. °° I further suggested that federal courts must
exercise their jurisdiction over "all Cases," including those arising
under the Constitution, but not necessarily over all "Controversies"-especially when the dispute turns on state law and the state
court will likely be impartial. 101
To develop this thesis more fully, I will try to recapture the
original understanding of judicial federalism. I will then explain
how this Federalist vision has been distorted over the past century,
and how its revival could usefully clarify the major doctrines of
jurisdictional restraint.
II. ORIGINALIST PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The most relevant historical evidence concerns the Supreme
Court's role vis-A-vis the state tribunals. To understand this
relationship, it is helpful first to describe generally the federal
judiciary's structure, powers, and limits.
A. The Nature of FederalJudicialPower
1. HistoricalBackground
The Articles of Confederation formed an alliance of sovereign
states, whose legislatures retained all real power and often passed
principles-particularly Article III's tenure and salary guarantees for federal judges and the
imperative of federal judicial review of allegedly unconstitutional state conduct-prevent
Congress from asserting its power over jurisdiction to take away all federal court jurisdiction
over constitutional claims).
99. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/ControversyDistinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994). I follow Professor Amar's
Neo-Federalist methodology. See supra note 95.
100. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 449-50, 472-84, 487-92, 493-511.
101. See id. at 518-31.
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unjust laws.° 2 The Articles established a weak central government,
in which a Congress controlled the executive and judiciary. 103 State
actions contrary to national laws and treaties could not be checked
by state judges, who usually depended upon their legislatures for
their tenure and salary. 01 4 Nor could the national tribunals enforce
judgments against the states in those rare cases when they had
jurisdiction.0 5
The resulting chaos in the 1780s prompted Federalist thinkers to
relocate "sovereignty"-absolute and final lawmaking authority
-from the legislature (the English model) to "the People" collectively.0 6 In the new Federal Constitution, "We the People" gave
their federal government agents increased power to address
matters that concerned more than one state or Americans collectively, such as foreign affairs.0 7 To prevent the federal government
from becoming oppressive, however, the People distributed its
powers among the three branches, thereby making the executive
and judiciary coordinate rather than subordinate. 0 8
Of special importance here, Article III vests federal "judicial
Power"-the rendering of a final judgment after applying the law

102. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 16, 21, 22 (Alexander Hamilton). For an excellent
analysis of the Confederation government, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 393-429, 463-67, 475-83 (1969).
103. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (empowering Congress to appoint temporary
executive committees and judicial tribunals). For criticisms of this arrangement, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 38, at 247 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 2 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 458-59
(James Wilson) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
104. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27-28 (James
Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS]; WOOD, supra note 102,
at 154-61, 407-08, 451-54; Pushaw, supra note 12, at 409-10.
105. See Pushaw, supranote 99, at 468-70.
106. See WOOD, supranote 102, at 259-63, 272-83,291-343, 362-63,372-89,453-63,530-53,
569-609; Amar, supra note 83, at 1430-37, 1444-45.
107. See, e.g., 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 103, at 497-98 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST
No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison); Pushaw, supranote
12, at 413-15.
108. See 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 103, at 496-97 (John Jay); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 103, at 257 (Alexander Hamilton); 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 104, at 147
(James Wilson); id. at 124 (James Madison); see also Pushaw, supra note 12, at 397-99, 41519,427,451,469-72,478 (setting forth the pertinent history, and concluding that the modern
Court's approach to justiciability weakens the coordinate role of the judiciary and
commensurately increases the political branches' power).
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to the facts l° 9 -in independent federal courts"' in two main
categories: The first is "all Cases" involving subjects of unique
national concern, most crucially those "arising under [the] Constitution.""' This provision, read in conjunction with the Supremacy
Clause" 2 and in the context of a written Constitution based upon
popular sovereignty, authorizes federal judges to examine the
constitutional validity of government actions." 3 Federal judges
would develop special expertise in federal law, as well as in
admiralty and the law of nations." 4 The second Article III category
consists of six types of "Controversies" in which parties (such as
different states or their citizens) needed a neutral federal forum,
regardless of whether the applicable law was federal or state. 115
"Cases" and "Controversies" came in several established forms at
law or in equity. 116 Most common was the civil cause of action,
initiated by an ordinary writ (e.g., trespass or debt) to resolve a
private dispute involving property, a contract, or a tort." 7 Less
109. For the historical development of the concept of 'Judicial power" in England and
America, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 746, 789, 805-06, 809, 827, 844-46 (2001);
Pushaw, supra note 99, at 471, 474-78, 489-92.
110. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (guaranteeing judges tenure during "good Behaviour" and
compensation that could not be reduced); see alsoTHE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 348-49 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (praising such protections as necessary to ensure the
judges' independence). All federal courts are equally autonomous and structurally superior
to state judges, who lack similar independence and national accountability and therefore
cannot be trusted with ultimate power to decide federal cases. See Amar, supra note 95, at
221-30, 233-38, 247-58, 262-63.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
113. Hamilton made the classic argument: (1) courts must resolve cases impartially
according to the law; (2) the written Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law in
which the People explicitly limited the political branches; (3) therefore, judges must follow
the Constitution instead of a clearly contrary ordinary law. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 52326 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Gordon Wood has masterfully traced the
intellectual development of the idea of judicial review during the 1770s and 1780s. See
WOOD, supra note 102, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-343, 383-89, 433-63, 549. For a detailed
summary of the original understanding that the Constitution authorized judicial review to
disregard clearly unconstitutional laws, see Pushaw, supra note 12, at 422-25.
114. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 496-502 (citing historical sources).
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a detailed discussion of "Controversies," see
Pushaw, supra note 99, at 504-11.
116. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 472-82 (citing supporting historical materials).
117. When such common law disputes either pitted parties who had been granted a federal
forum by Article III (e.g., citizens of different states) or raised legal questions identified in
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frequently, citizens brought public actions to enforce government
compliance with the law through either extraordinary writs (e.g.,
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto)" 8 or informer
and relator actions." 9 Finally, higher courts could review decisions
of inferior tribunals through a writ of error or an appeal.1 2 °
In this framework, what we today call "standing" existed if a
plaintiff had an action or appeal under one of these traditional
forms. 21 The Constitution allowed Congress significant discretion
to determine which parties had standing'2 2 and to distribute
jurisdiction among federal courts.'2 3
2. Early Supreme Court Precedent ConcerningJurisdiction
Federal courts unfailingly exercised their statutory jurisdiction
over "all Cases." Indeed, the Marshall Court expansively interpreted such jurisdiction, especially as it concerned federal ques-

Article III (e.g., federal law, admiralty, or the law governing foreign ministers), federal court
jurisdiction would lie as long as Congress had conferred it.
118. See, e.g., Pushaw, supranote 12, at 426,438 n.197 and accompanying text (describing
these writs and summarizing their incorporation into early federal statutes and their
interpretation by the Supreme Court); see also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818-24 (1969) (noting that this
longstanding writ practice conflicts with the Court's assertion that standing to bring public
actions requires a common law injury).
119. Informers asserted violations of criminal or regulatory laws, not because the laws
were being applied to them, but rather to get a financial share of the penalty assessed
against the violator. Relator actions authorized citizens to act as private attorneys general
in prosecuting matters of general public interest, such as the proper administration of a
public trust. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1398-99, 1406-09 (1988) (discussing informer and relator
suits in England and in America's early constitutional government).
120. In an appeal, a higher court reexamined the entire case litigated in a lower tribunal
for any legal mistakes. By contrast, a writ of error involved reviewing the record below and
either affirming or reversing based upon a single point of law. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 409-12 (1821) (citing Coke and Bacon as support for this distinction).
121. Several scholars have developed this argument. See Lee A. Albert, Standing to
Challenge AdministrativeAction: An InadequateSurrogatefor Claimfor Relief, 83 YALE L.J.
425 (1974); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
122. See Pushaw, supra note 12, at 481-90.
123. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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tions. 2 4 For example, Osborn v. Bank of the United States'25 held

that federal trial courts had jurisdiction whenever federal law
"forms an ingredient of the original cause."'26 Similarly, at the
appellate level, the Court broadly asserted jurisdiction to ensure the
supremacy and uniformity of federal law.'
The Court identified only three exceptions to the rule of exercising federal question jurisdiction, each of which reflected the
Framers' understanding of "judicial power" in our constitutional
system based upon separation of powers. 28 First, the Justices
declined to issue formal advisory opinions on legal questions29
submitted by the political branches outside the litigation context. 1
Second, Congress could not require federal judges to render
decisions that could be revised by the political branches.3 a Third,
124. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824)
('This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the
[C]onstitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them
shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it.").
125. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
126. Id. at 823. Specifically, the Court ruled that because a federal statute created the
Bank of the United States, any cause of action it brought would require proof of the Bank's
capacities and thus would arise under federal law, even if the underlying basis of the claim
was state law. Id. at 818-28; see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action,
89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 778, 800-17 (2004) (arguing that Osborn incorporated a formal, rigid
conception of a "cause of action" focusing on the form of proceeding that provided the remedy,
and rejecting the prevailing view that the Marshall Court flexibly recognized federal court
jurisdiction whenever either a federal right had been asserted or a question of federal law

potentially might arise in litigation).
127. For an account of the constitutional and statutory framework for Supreme Court
review of federal question cases, see supranotes 32, 69, 110-12 and accompanying text and
infra notes 149-55, 157-66 and accompanying text.
128. I have substantiated this point in Pushaw, supra note 12, at 436-52.
129. See Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to President George Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), reprintedin STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF

EARLY JUDGES app. at 179-80 (1997) (refusing to answer President Washington's abstract
questions about treaties and international law because of separation-of-powers concerns); see
also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any "DearJohn" Letters:
Advisory Opinions in HistoricalPerspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 473-74, 477-83, 490-91 (1998)
(arguing that this Letter faithfully implemented the intent of the Framers, who had
deliberately authorized the President to obtain written advice exclusively from his executive
subordinates and had limited the Court to issuing opinions only after the President had acted
and a litigated case had arisen).
130. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); see also Pushaw, supra note 12, at
403-04, 438-41 (demonstrating that the Justices faithfully adhered to the Framers' and
Ratifiers' understanding that finality of judgments was a crucial aspect of true judicial
power).
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the Court could decide only "legal" issues, not "political" questions
President or
that the Constitution left to the discretion of 3 the
1
Congress, such as the conduct of foreign affairs.'
The Court's three seminal decisions establishing these jurisdictional limits all involved the coordinate federal branches and rested
upon a prudential balancing of factors guided mainly by separation
of powers. Hence, the Justices had no need to discuss federalism.
Moreover, in these three cases it did not occur to anyone that state
courts could then seize jurisdiction and reach a different result that
32
would alter the balance among the three federal departments.
Hence, the Court's original justiciability doctrines did not create
any gap in the enforcement of federal law that the state courts
filled.
By contrast, the Court did make several exceptions to its "Contro34
33
versies" jurisdiction. 1 Most notably, in Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
the Court held that statutory diversity jurisdiction should be
exercised only when each plaintiff was a citizen of a state different
from each defendant. 135 Such disputes would necessarily be
relegated to state tribunals.'36 Moreover, the Court interpreted
"United States party" jurisdiction narrowly to exclude controversies

131. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-71, 173-80 (1803); see also Talbot
v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801); Pushaw, supranote 12, at 446-51 (showing that
Chief Justice Marshall's analysis of judicial review and justiciability exactly tracked
Hamilton's argument during Ratification).
132. Put differently, these three cases involved congressional attempts to authorize federal
courts to make decisions that would upset the Constitution's separation-of-powers scheme.
In none of these instances did state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to apply federal law
as part of their exercise of state judicial power.
133. These cases are summarized in Pushaw, supra note 99, at 506-11.
134. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
135. See id. at 267-68; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-20 (1831)
(ruling that an Indian Tribe was not a "foreign state" within the meaning of the jurisdictional
statute implementing Article III and hence was unable to bring suit); Hodgson v. Bowerbank,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303-04 (1809) (construing a federal statute and Article III as extending
jurisdiction only to controversies between foreigners and American citizens, not between two
foreigners); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85-87 (1809) (holding
that a federal bank corporation was not a "citizen" and thus could not sue in diversity).
136. Later in the nineteenth century, the Court created federalism-based exceptions to
diversity jurisdiction involving subjects deemed to be of special importance to the states. See
Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 618-19 (1893) (probate); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890) (divorce and custody).
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in which the federal government was a defendant rather than a
plaintiff.'3 7
B. The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and State
Tribunals
1. The Constitutionaland Statutory Framework
Although "We the People" increased the national government's
authority, they hardly made it monolithic. Rather, states remained
autonomous governments that retained all their preexisting
jurisdiction, unless the Constitution expressly withdrew such power
or granted it exclusively to the federal government. 1 38 Each state
controlled its own legal development through a form of government
that reflected its unique history and political traditions.'3 9 Many
states followed an English model of separation of powers that was
far more flexible than that of the federal Constitution, especially
regarding the role of the judiciary. 40
To illustrate, state judges performed various administrative
tasks, reflecting the British notion that "judicial" power was part of

137. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335-36 (1816). The Founders understood the same limitation
as applying to "Controversies" involving foreign nations, who could sue in federal court but
could not be sued without their consent under established immunity principles. See, e.g., 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 103, at 593 (James Madison); id. at 557 (John Marshall). State
courts would likewise decline to decide such suits against the federal government or foreign
countries, thereby leaving potential claimants to political remedies. Hence, an unavoidable
gap in judicial enforcement of the Constitution would arise in these few cases.
138. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 1
FARRAND, RECORDS, supranote 104, at 60 (Rufus King); id. at 153-54, 157 (James Wilson and
John Dickinson); 3 id. at 99 (letter of Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth); 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 103, at 286 (Charles Pinckney). The Tenth Amendment confirmed this
principle by providing that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
139. See WOOD, supra note 102, at 125-467.
140. See Hershkoff, supra note 22, at 1882-98, 1905-06 (noting that states have always had
diverse, and often changing, approaches to separation of powers); id. at 1880-81 ("Colonial
charters, which said little about courts, established functionally ambiguous institutions that
blended executive, legislative, and judiciary activities-institutions that the Framers are
thought to have specifically rejected in adopting Article III.').
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the "executive" power to enforce the law. 141 Several state courts
rendered formal advisory opinions, 11 2 even though federal judges
could not do so,14 3 and the Framers could reasonably have foreseen
that such opinions might concern whether a proposed state action
44
comported with the federal Constitution. 1
To take another example of a unique English practice, certain
state legislatures, like the House of Lords, served as the highest
court of appeal. 145 Again, the Framers and Ratifiers were aware
that, contrary to practice under the new federal Constitution, some
states would allow the political branches to review judicial judg146
ments (which could include interpretations of federal law).

141. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 102, at 154-61; Hershkoff, supra note 22, at 1871.
Although the English did not conceive of a separate judicial power, they did recognize that
courts exercised a distinct function (adjudication) and required independence from the King
and Parliament to perform this function properly. See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 5-7, 101-03 (1965).
142. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. 3, art. 2; Fletcher, supranote 32, at 267-68
(describing early American advisory opinion practice).
143. Convention delegates unsuccessfully proposed a provision for such opinions modeled
on the one in the Massachusetts Constitution. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 104, at
334. Numerous other schemes to involve federal judges in advising the political branches also
failed. See Pushaw, supra note 129, at 478-80.
144. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 269 n.27 (citing examples where such advice was
sought). In giving advisory opinions, state judges have always acted as objective legal experts
providing non-binding recommendations to the political branches, not as courts of law
rendering final judgments. See id. at 268-69, 285 (making this point, and noting that state
advisory opinions have never been treated as precedent or been given preclusive effect).
Hence, advisory opinions, even if they concern matters of federal law, never assume a
judicial form capable of being appealed to any higher court. Nonetheless, if state political
officials take the action for which they requested an advisory opinion, and if litigation arises
in which the state judges adhere to their prior opinion on federal law, the Supreme Court can
then exercise appellate jurisdiction. In this way, its ultimate review over all federal law
remains intact.
145. Some state constitutions specified that appeals courts would be composed of members
of the political branches. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 17; N.J. CONST. of 1776, IX; N.Y.
CONST. of 1777, art. XXXII. In most states, the legislature reigned supreme and either
directly wielded all types of government power (including judicial) or indirectly influenced
the exercise of judicial power by controlling judges' appointment, tenure, and salary. See
WOOD, supra note 102, 154-61, 407-08, 451-54.
146. See Hershkoff, supra note 22, at 1880-81.
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Moreover, the Supremacy Clause.4 recognizes that state courts,
in exercising state judicial power in litigated cases, will sometimes
have to apply federal law (including the Constitution), and the
Clause admonishes them to do so faithfully. Therefore, the Framers
gave state tribunals the opportunity, in the first instance, to
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all Article III matters, unless
Congress made a particular subject exclusive to the federal
judiciary. 14 ' Nonetheless, recent history had demonstrated that
state judges could not always be trusted with national laws because
of their susceptibility to direct political pressure and their parochial
bias in favor of state interests.149 Thus, only independent Article III
courts with expertise in federal law would be given final interpretive authority. 5 0 Ultimately, the Supreme Court would ensure the
supremacy and uniformity of federal law. '51 As Alexander Hamilton
explained, absent the possibility of an appeal from state tribunals
to the Supreme Court,
the local courts [would have to] be excluded from a concurrent
jurisdiction in matters of national concern, else the judiciary
authority of the union may be eluded at the pleasure of every
[state] plaintiff or prosecutor[,] ... [which] would defeat some of
147.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 554-55 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
149. Several Framers stressed this state court failure. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22,
at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note
104, at 46 (Edmund Randolph); 1 id. at 124 (James Madison); id. at 125 (James Wilson);
Pushaw, supra note 99, at 497 n.247 (citing statements to similar effect during Ratification,
the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, and early Supreme Court decisions).
150. For a persuasive explanation of why federal rather than state judges must have
ultimate power to decide federal question cases, see Amar, supranote 95, at 221-30, 233-38,
247-58, 262-63, 266.
151. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). The Constitution plainly grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over federal
law cases from state courts. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 555-56 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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the most important and avowed purposes of the proposed
government .... [T]he national and state systems are to be
regarded as ONE WHOLE. The courts of the latter will of course
be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the union,
and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal
[the U.S. Supreme Court], which is destined to unite and
assimilate the principles of national justice and the rules of
national decisions. The evident aim of the plan of the convention
is, that all the causes of the specified classes [in Article III],
shall for weighty public reasons receive their original or final
determination in the courts of the Union. 152

The Judiciary Act of 1789153 implemented the foregoing Federalist
notion of judicial federalism. Congress provided for original federal
jurisdiction over many issues of federal law, but rarely made that
jurisdiction exclusive.154 Because the vast majority of American trial
courts were state rather than federal, state judges initially decided
most federal (including nearly all constitutional) questions. Section
25 of the Judiciary Act, however, authorized Supreme Court review
of the state's highest court over any decision that denied federal
rights."15

In sum, the Constitution and its implementing legislation
allowed state courts to apply federal law, but preserved review by
the Supreme Court if they failed to discharge their duty.
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 555-56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
The last sentence of this quote reveals Hamilton's understanding that federal judges, either
trial or appellate, would decide all the cases and controversies listed in Article III. He did not
suggest any discretion, either legislative or judicial, to make exceptions to Article III
jurisdiction. Thus, Hamilton would not have accepted either the Court's creation of doctrines
to decline to hear federal question cases or my suggestion to curtail diversity jurisdiction.
153. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
154. Although the orthodox view is that federal courts did not receive general federal
question jurisdiction until the Judiciary Act of 1875, Professor Engdahl has argued that the
1789 Act provided for federal jurisdiction over all cases that could have been contemplated
as arising under federal law. See David E. Engdahl, FederalQuestion JurisdictionUnder the
1789 JudiciaryAct, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 521 (1989) (citing sources). What is undisputed
is that state courts have always had concurrent power to decide federal questions. It was not
until the 1875 amendment, however, that the Supreme Court ruled definitively that Article
III permits such concurrent jurisdiction. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
155. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. This provision, and the absence
of an appeal for state judgments upholdingfederal law, reflects Congress's well-founded fear
that state courts would under-protect (not over-enforce) federal rights. See Daniel J. Meltzer,
The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1585-90 (1990).

1322

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1289

2. Early Precedent
The Supreme Court quickly recognized that states had ultimate
power over their own law.1" 6 Yet it emphatically repudiated their
attempts to assert157similar authority over federal law, particularly
the Constitution.
In Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,'58 the Court rejected the claim that
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act had unconstitutionally extended its
appellate jurisdiction to state tribunals.' 59 In his opinion, Justice
Story noted that Article III granted the Court appellate jurisdiction
over "all Cases" arising under the federal Constitution and laws,
60
without making any exception for cases decided in the states.
Justice Story then stressed that the Supremacy Clause contemplated that state judges would adjudicate federal questions, and
that such judgments had to be reviewed by the Court to ensure
federal supremacy: 6 '
The Constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we
do not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices, state
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or
control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular
administration of justice .... If there were no revising authority

to control these jarring and discordant [state court] judgments,
and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and
the constitution of the United States would be different in
different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the
162
same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states.

156. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("[Tihis court has
no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state Legislature, contrary to the
Constitution of such state, is void.").
157. Advocates of "states rights" argued that the people of each state were sovereign and
retained the final power to determine, through the "interposition" of their judges, whether
the federal Constitution had been breached. Amar, supra note 83, at 1451-55.
158. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
159. Id. at 323-52.
160. Id. at 337-39; see also id. at 339-40 (reasoning that, if Congress had not established
inferior federal tribunals, the Court's appellate jurisdiction could only have acted on state

courts).
161. Id. at 340-42.
162. Id. at 347-48.
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Chief Justice Marshall reprised these themes in Cohens v.
Virginia,'13 which affirmed the Court's power to examine state
judgments on federal law, even where the state itself was a party
and claimed sovereign immunity.' He explained that the states,
by ratifying the Article III provision authorizing appellate jurisdiction over "all" federal question cases, had given up any prior
sovereign immunity they may have had.'6 5 Chief Justice Marshall
stressed that the Constitution would be frustrated by allowing each
state, with the approval of its politically dependent courts, to resist
or defeat legitimate federal laws-especially the Constitution, the
People's fundamental and supreme law.' s
Finally, the Supreme Court did not make any exceptions to its
appellate review when a state court had entertained a case that
would have been non-justiciable under federal standards. For
instance, in Calder v. Bull,'6 7 the Connecticut Legislature set aside
the judgment of a probate court, which promptly reversed its decree
(a decision upheld by the state's appellate courts) despite the claim
that this procedure violated the federal Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause. 66 The Supreme Court affirmed,' 9 emphasizing that
Connecticut's legislature had always exercised the "judicial"
function of setting aside court judgments. 7 0 Hence, if the legislature's action was characterized as "judicial," it complied with state
law (as the Connecticut courts had found) and raised no issues
under the federal Constitution.''
163. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
164. Id. at 375-430.
165. Id. at 379-404.
166. Id. at 383-92, 414-15. The Court held that the Eleventh Amendment, which
prohibited construing federal "judicial power" to extend to "any suit ...
commenced or
prosecuted" against a state by a citizen of another state, did not apply for two reasons. Id.
at 405-06. First, the case did not involve a "suit" (i.e., a plaintiffs claim of a remedy for the
violation of a legal right), but rather was brought by a "writ of error" (i.e., an appeal on a
single point of law). Id. at 405-12. Second, the Cohens were citizens of Virginia, not "another
State." Id. at 412.
167. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
168. Id. at 386-87, 393 (Chase, J.).
169. At that time, the Court consisted of five Justices. The Chief Justice did not
participate, and the remaining four Justices delivered their opinions seriatim.
170. Id. at 395-96 (Paterson, J.); see also id. at 387 (Chase, J.) (alluding indirectly to this
practice); id. at 400-01 (Cushing, J.); id. at 398 (Iredell, J.).
171. Id. at 395-96 (Paterson, J.); id. at 400 (Cushing, J.). Alternatively, if the legislature
had acted in its 'legislative" capacity, it had not passed an ex post facto law in violation of
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Calder is critical because the Supreme Court exercised its
appellate jurisdiction even though the state court's original decision
had been rendered under circumstances that would have made it
non-justiciable under federal standards.17 2 Calder indicates that
state courts could validly do so and could decide any federal issues
presented, but that the Supreme Court would be available to make
sure federal law had been correctly expounded. None of the four
Justices who wrote opinions in Calder suggested that a state trial
court's application of a lenient justiciability standard had any
bearing on the Supreme Court's ability to review the case.'7 3
In sum, within three decades the Court had settled two bedrock
principles of judicial federalism. First, state courts have general
jurisdiction, which includes final authority over their states' laws
and concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving federal law.
Second, the Supreme Court can always exercise appellate jurisdiction to ensure that federal rights have been enforced.

III. THE NEW JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES AS DEVICES TO CONTROL
FEDERAL DOCKETS

In the late nineteenth century, the Court began to depart from
originalist principles of federalism by carving exceptions to
congressionally granted jurisdiction over federal question cases."7 4
the federal Constitution, which prohibited only retroactive criminal laws and thus did not
apply to civil probate matters. Id. at 389-95 (Chase, J.); id. at 395-97 (Paterson, J.); id. at
398-400 (Iredell, J.); id. at 400-01 (Cushing, J.).
172. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (describing Hayburn's Case, which held
that federal judges could not issue judgments subject to review by the political branches).
173. In Calder, no federal court had original jurisdiction because the dispute arose under
state probate law, and no general federal question jurisdiction existed to hear Calder's
federal law challenge. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text. By contrast, in the
major modern cases, state and federal trial courts have had concurrent subject matter
jurisdiction, and the state court has proceeded where the federal judge would have dismissed
under stricter justiciability standards. In such cases, it is only the plaintiffs initial choice of
a state over a federal forum that ultimately forces the Supreme Court to decide whether to
grant review. Despite this difference, Calder suggests that the Court will review a state
judicial decision adverse to federal rights, regardless of the justiciability standards applied
at the trial stage.
174. Until that time, federal question jurisdiction had been fully exercised, subject to the
three traditional exceptions. First, the Justices never rendered public advisory opinions. See
Hershkoff, supra note 22, at 1844-45 (citing cases). Second, the political branches could not
tamper with federal court judgments. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561
(1865) (no opinion), 117 U.S. 697, 703 app. (1885) (reprinting opinion of Taney, C.J., citing
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The reason is that Reconstruction began a never-ending process
of federal law expansion, which inexorably displaced preexisting
state regulation. Initially, Congress spearheaded passage of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and enacted
implementing legislation.17 Congress then exercised its power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate both business (e.g.,
antitrust) and public morals (e.g., by prohibiting the interstate
transportation of lottery tickets and prostitutes).1 7 6 Most significantly, the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in 1887 ushered in modern administrative agencies, which exploded
during the New Deal.' 7 7
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)). Third, the presumption favoring judicial review
could be rebutted when the constitutional question presented was "political." See Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 34-46 (1849) (deferring to the determination of Congress and the
President that Rhode Island's established government, which had declared martial law to
suppress a revolutionary new regime, had the "Republican Form of Government" required
by Article IV). Luther is of special interest because the Court emphasized two federalism
concerns: protecting state governments from instability and respecting their own political
question doctrine (here, the Rhode Island courts' determination that the legitimacy of the
established state government was a matter for "political" rather than "judicial" resolution).
Id. at 13-14, 38-40. As Luther illustrates, the states developed their own justiciability
doctrines. Indeed, states could deviate from federal standards, as reflected in advisory
opinion practice in several states. See supranotes 142-44 and accompanying text.
The other justiciability rules remained relatively static. In both federal and state courts,
standing continued to be a question of whether the law granted a particular plaintiff a cause
of action, and mootness was still a matter ofjudicial discretion. See, e.g., Mills v. Green, 159
U.S. 651 (1895). Ripeness did not exist. Similarly, no cases mentioned doctrines such as
abstention, the well-pleaded complaint rule, or state sovereign immunity.
175. The key law was the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The promise of
equality quickly faded, however, because the Court interpreted this statute-and the
Fourteenth Amendment which it implemented-very narrowly. The major decisions, in
chronological order, were: The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
(interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause as allowing states to discriminate against
their citizens as to rights under state law, but not as to rights that attached to United States
citizenship); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act's
prohibition of race discrimination in privately owned public accommodations such as inns
and theaters on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause reached only state action); and
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause permits
states to provide "separate but equal" accommodations for blacks and whites).
176. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control over Social Issues, 85 IowA L. REV. 1, 67-79 (1999) (describing the Court's
inconsistent treatment of this federal legislation).
177. See Pushaw, supranote 12, at 456-57 (discussing this expansion of the administrative
state). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421 (1987) (arguing that modern, centralized, executive administrative agencies cannot
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After spending half a century vacillating on the constitutionality of such legislation, the Supreme Court embraced virtually
unlimited federal power. 7 ' Moreover, the Warren Court and its
successors have upheld broad civil rights'79 and environmental
regulation, 180 and have expanded judicial review to dizzying
heights.' 8 '
As federal statutory, regulatory, and constitutional law grew
exponentially, so did federal caseloads. 1 82 A main cause was the
be reconciled with the Constitution's original design of separated, balanced, and checked
federal power, but that similar structural safeguards could be achieved through active and
coordinated inter-branch review of the work of these agencies).
178. The landmark cases were NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to pass the National Labor
Relations Act) and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (sustaining the Social Security Act
as a valid exercise of the Spending Power). See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(allowing Congress to rely upon the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activities
that occurred entirely within a state as long as such activities, when considered in the
aggregate, "substantially affected" interstate commerce). Simultaneously, the Court
abandoned its precedent striking down progressive state economic legislation as violating
Substantive Due Process. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding
a state minimum wage law).
179. The key decisions sustained the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
prohibited discrimination by public accommodations such as restaurants and hotels. See
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
180. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (approving federal laws regulating the
environmental impacts of mining). As with most modern federal legislation, environmental
and civil rights laws have been based upon a broad reading of the Commerce Clause. See
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretationof the
Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 715-17 (2002).
181. The Warren Court created an ever-increasing variety of constitutional rights based
on a generous interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (discovering a right to use contraception lurking in
penumbras emanating from the Due Process Clause and various other provisions of the Bill
of Rights); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited states from operating racially segregated schools); see also LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (analyzing the Warren
Court's major decisions in the larger American social and political context). Although the
pace of judicial activism has slowed, it has not ended. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (reversing precedent in striking down a state law prohibiting homosexual sodomy
as violating the Due Process right to liberty).
Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court has expanded judicial review by applying more exacting
scrutiny to congressional legislation passed under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For a keen analysis, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative"
Paths of the Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429 (2002).
182. See Fletcher, supra note 121, at 224-28; William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of
FederalJudicial Power, 1863-1876, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969); Winter, supra note
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1875 statute granting federal trial courts general federal question
jurisdiction, which reflected Congress's judgment that such a forum
was needed to ensure proper enforcement of federal law.18 Congress attempted to alleviate the resultant docket congestion by
increasing the number of federal judges and by creating numerous
non-Article III adjudicators, such as administrative law judges.'8 4
Under originalist principles, federal district courts had a duty to
exercise their federal question jurisdiction whenever it was
invoked.185 Nonetheless, the Court apparently concluded that the
judiciary could not handle all the cases now within their jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Justices fabricated many new doctrines to lessen
federal question jurisdiction. It is no coincidence that these
doctrines began to appear in the last part of the nineteenth century.
Examples include the adequate and independent state grounds
doctrine (first suggested in 1875 and firmly endorsed in 1893),186
state sovereign immunity in 1890,187 and the well-pleaded complaint rule in 1908.188 The New Deal regulatory leviathan begat the
justiciability and abstention doctrines, which were later expanded
to meet the renewed docket crunches caused by the Great Society
and the Warren Court constitutional revolution.'8 9
The Supreme Court, however, did not candidly acknowledge that
these doctrines rested on practical and prudential considerations.' 9
Rather, it constructed a story of continuity. In particular, the Court
asserted that its jurisdictional doctrines implemented the Founders'
119, at 1452-53.
183. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470-73 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993)).
184. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,Article III Courts, and the JudicialPower
of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004).
185. See supranotes 1,4-9, 54-55, 63, 69, 76, 83-84, 87-88, 95-101, 111-14, 123-27, 149-55,
157-73 and accompanying text. If they wished, parties could use the state judicial system to
litigate federal questions, with the right to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
186. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
189. See Pushaw, supranote 12, at 456-67.
190. For the definitive analysis of this prudential treatment of justiciability, see Winter,
supra note 119, at 1376-78, 1422-24, 1442-48, 1454-57; see also Fletcher, supra note 32, at
279 (arguing that the modern approach to justiciability was based on pragmatism rather
than constitutional history, and that therefore the Court should feel free to modify these
doctrines).
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conception of Article III and judicial federalism, which purportedly
recognized state judges as equally capable and trustworthy in
enforcing federal constitutional law.'9 1 Although it is true that the
Framers recognized that state tribunals inevitably would have to
decide constitutional questions, they understood that only federal
courts had the independence and expertise to do so conclusively.
Whether right or wrong, however, the Court shows no signs of
retreating from its vision of federalism, probably because of the fear
that doing so would overwhelm the federal judiciary. But can we
formulate a constitutional theory that comports with basic principles of judicial federalism, yet allows federal courts to keep their
dockets at manageable levels? I will attempt to sketch such an
approach.
IV. IMPOSING JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE LAW

"CONTROVERSIES," NOT FEDERAL LAW "CASES"
The Founders' cardinal rule of judicial federalism, which applies
with undiminished force today, is that independent Article III
courts have an indispensable role in ensuring the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law, especially the Constitution. 192 Therefore,
federal judges should never decline to exercise their jurisdiction
over federal question cases.'9 3 If performing this vital duty creates
intolerable docket pressures, then they should sharply limit their

191. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 447-65. For the classic refutation of the Court's claim
that federal and state courts are interchangeable in their ability and willingness to enforce
federal law, see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
192. See supranotes 109-14, 124-27, 150-55, 157-66 and accompanying text.
193. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 523-31.
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jurisdiction over controversies involving state law.194 Article III
provides two possible textual bases for such discretion.
First, it expressly confers "judicial" power, which has always been
understood as adjudicating cases deliberatively by ascertaining the
law, applying it to the facts, and rendering a judgment."9 5 If federal
courts lack the time and resources to consider fairly and reasonably
every matter that falls within their jurisdiction, then to avoid
arbitrary rulings they must establish a principled method to decide
what to decide.' 9 6 Federalism dictates that cases involving federal
constitutional law receive top priority.
Second, as explained above, Article III requires federal courts to
decide "all Cases," but not all "Controversies."19 7 In prudentially
determining which "Controversies" to punt, federal judges should

194. Indeed, the Court already has made several such exceptions, such as the rule against
complete diversity, but has justified them in terms of statutory interpretation rather than
docket management. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 506-11. 1 am aware of only one instance
in which a federal court has articulated the latter rationale. In Thermtron Products,Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), a federal district judge in Kentucky conceded the
existence of diversity jurisdiction, but remanded the case to state court on the ground that
his heavy docket would unjustly delay the trial. Id. at 339-44. The judge issued many similar
orders for the purpose of giving priority to the massive number of pending cases arising
under federal laws concerning crime and black-lung disease. Id. at 340-41 nn.3-4. The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the pertinent federal jurisdictional statute did not
give the district court discretion to decline to proceed because of a crowded docket. Id. at 34345.
It is equally true, however, that the statute conferring federal question jurisdiction does
not grant any judicial discretion to abstain. Nonetheless, federal courts routinely do so by
invoking doctrines such as justiciability, abstention, and the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The Court's countenancing of such discretion in federal law cases, but not in state law
controversies, is precisely backwards.
195. See Pushaw, Inherent Powers, supra note 109, at 746, 789, 805-06, 809, 827, 844-46
(documenting the Founders' understanding of"judicial power," which reflected centuries of
evolution in England and America).
196. The Due Process Clause supplies a separate constitutional basis for prohibiting hasty
and unreasoned judicial decisions. Moreover, both Article III 'Judicial Power" and the Due
Process Clause suggest that judges cannot decline jurisdiction merely because they would
prefer not to hear a matter-especially if such reluctance reflects ideology, such as a hostility
to civil rights or environmental claims. Many have argued that the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have engaged in such political manipulation of the justiciability doctrines. See, e.g.,
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing:A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
635, 635-37, 639-47, 649-52, 656-59 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Standing:Law or Politics?,77
N.C. L. REv. 1741 (1999); see also George & Pushaw, supra note 13, at 1278-80 (evaluating
such accusations).
197. See supra notes 95-101, 109-15, 160-62 and accompanying text.
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consider several interrelated factors. 9 ' The most crucial is whether

state or federal law applies. Federal courts should never decline
jurisdiction when the latter law is at issue-for example, the federal
common law that typically governs "Controversies" between
states'9 9 and those involving foreign nations and their citizens.

°°

However, most "Controversies" (e.g., diversity) turn on state
substantive law, in which state courts are more competent.2 ° '
In such matters, the sole justification for federal jurisdiction is
that state judges lack the same independence as their federal
counterparts, and thus have personal and political incentives to
favor their home state parties and interests.0 2 Although this fear
198. Initially, federal courts should dismiss any "Controversies" that do not satisfy
justiciability standards. Because Article III "Controversies" are disputes involving one of the
enumerated parties, they are appropriately subject to the justiciability doctrines, all of which
focus on whether there is a live dispute between adverse parties. See Pushaw, supranote 99,
at 519. By contrast, this dispute-resolution paradigm makes little sense as applied to Article
III "Cases," which depend on the interpretation of substantive law, regardless of party status.
Id. at 523-31.
Even if a federal court concludes that a plaintiff has standing and presents a ripe, non-

moot claim, it should still decline jurisdiction if it concludes that another forum (most
obviously, a state court) would be impartial and competent to decide the dispute as an
original matter. Id. at 520-22. This section identifies the considerations that are relevant in
making this judgment call.
199. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 48, 86 (1907) (applying federal judge-made
rules to help resolve a dispute over riparian rights).
200. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (using federal
common law to determine whether Cuba could invoke the "act of state" doctrine); see also
Pushaw, supranote 109, at 746-47 (citing cases applying federal common law). Surprisingly,
the Court has declined to exercise its statutorily mandated exclusive original jurisdiction
over "Controversies" between states when it concludes that they raise trivial issues and/or
that another forum would be more convenient. See, e.g., California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S.
1027, 1027-28 (1981) (refusing to adjudicate a breach-of-contract claim between state
universities over a cancelled football game).
201. See Pushaw, supranote 99, at 504-11, 519-23 (providing numerous examples of such
controversies and describing historical exceptions where federal rather than state common
law has been applied). Professor Shapiro is one of the few scholars who candidly
acknowledges that federal courts may legitimately exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction
to protect themselves from being overburdened. Shapiro, supranote 11, at 587-88. However,
he specifically rejects the idea that federal judges can refuse to adjudicate diversity suits on
the ground that they have more important functions (such as deciding federal question cases)
and that state courts are the more appropriate forums for the state law issues involved. Id.
at 587. By contrast, I believe that federal judges can legitimately prioritize federal law cases
over state law controversies.
202. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT

ITMEANS TODAY 231-35 (Harold W. Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978).
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of bias against non-residents originally animated diversity jurisdiction, it has lessened over the years as we have evolved into truly
"United" States. °3 Hence, rather than simply assuming such
partiality, perhaps federal courts should require the party invoking
their jurisdiction to make a colorable showing that a state judge or
court is likely to be biased against either her personally or out-ofstaters generally. 204 As Herbert Wechsler observed over a halfcentury ago:
What is needed is a total reconsideration of [diversity] jurisdiction, guided by the principle that federal judicial energy should
have
be preserved for vindication of those interests which ...
There is ...
become the subject of the federal substantive law ....
a solid case for preservation of the jurisdiction in any instance
where a concrete showing of state prejudice can be established. 0 5
203. Indeed, some Framers predicted that the need for such federal jurisdiction would
decrease as our national identity developed. See Akhil Reed Amar,The Two-Tiered Structure
of the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1555 (1990) (citing sources); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 292-93 (summarizing scholarly arguments that diversity
jurisdiction is no longer necessary because there is no empirical evidence that state courts
are biased against out-of-staters).
204. Admittedly, such a showing would present two dangers. First, it places a federal
judge in the delicate position of evaluating the impartiality of his or her state counterpart.
Second, a party who fails to gain access to the federal court incurs the wrath of the state
judge. See James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem:Article IIIand ConstitutionalChange,
79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1925 (2004) (contending that federal statutory regimes linking
federal jurisdiction to a demonstration of bias have worked poorly in practice). These very
risks, however, would give parties incentives to litigate their state law claims in state court,
unless they were confident that a federal court would take jurisdiction.
Another, even more radical, solution would be to limit diversity jurisdiction to its originally
intended primary beneficiaries, nonresident creditors. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 507
n.292, 522 n.350 (citing sources).
205. Herbert Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revisionof the JudicialCode, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS.216, 238-39 (1948) (footnote omitted). I should point out that Professor
Wechsler directed his argument to Congress rather than the judiciary; he thought Congress
had plenary control over federal jurisdiction and thus would not have endorsed my proposal
for judicial discretion to limit diversity controversies. See Wechsler, supra note 87, at 100506.
Arguably, my claim that we should not presume state court bias in diversity applies with
equal force to federal question cases. These two categories ofjurisdiction, however, implicate
quite different federal interests. In diversity controversies, the concern is possible prejudice
against out-of-state parties in private disputes arising under state law. By contrast, in
federal question cases, the problem is state court ignorance of, or hostility to, federal law
(especially constitutional rights). See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 61, at 265 (citing the ALI's
conclusion that such jurisdiction "protect[s] litigants relying on federal law from the danger
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Another relevant consideration is the federal government's
interest. This federal stake is strongest in "Controversies" where
the United States or a foreign nation is a party. Conversely, the
federal government qua government has little interest in diversity
jurisdiction, which exists merely to ensure that private out-ofstate parties get a decisionmaker whose impartiality cannot be
doubted. °6
A final factor is the percentage of "Controversies" on a particular
federal court's docket. For instance, diversity disputes consume
about twenty-five percent of federal judicial resources, which seems
grossly disproportionate to their national significance.2 °7 Federal
courts might reasonably reduce the number of their state law
"Controversies" to increase, or speed disposition of, their federal law
"Cases."
An obvious objection to my proposal is that such judicially crafted
exceptions to diversity jurisdiction would be radical innovations and
would defy Congress's will.2 °8 All doctrines of judicial restraint were
novel when they were created, however, and they too frustrate
Congress's intent to grant general federal question jurisdiction.
Hence, the pivotal question is not whether the Court should develop
rules to limit jurisdiction (an irreversible fait accompli), but rather
what restrictions make the most sense.
Indeed, the Court has adopted a pragmatic approach similar to
the one I recommend in restricting its own original jurisdiction over
controversies involving state parties.2 9 For instance, in Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemical Corp.,21° the Court declined to hear a state's
tort suit against out-of-state defendants, even though it concededly

that state courts will not properly apply that law, either through misunderstanding or lack
of sympathy") (footnote omitted). In my view, the federal government's interest in ensuring
the supremacy and uniformity of federal law is of paramount importance.
206. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 504-11, 519-23.
207. Id. at 522. This misallocation of federal judicial resources has prompted many
prominent Justices, lawyers, and scholars to recommend the abolition of diversity
jurisdiction. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 290-91 (citing sources).
208. Indeed, the Supreme Court made exactly this argument in rebuffing a federal district
judge who had dismissed diversity controversies in order to adjudicate pressing federal law
cases. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
209. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1993) (giving the Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction
over controversies involving states as parties).
210. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
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had original jurisdiction.211 The Court reasoned that it should
devote its resources to appellate review of federal questions, not
trials that required intensive fact-finding and that primarily
involved state law issues that could be handled more competently
by state judges.212 Moreover, the Court declared that it would not
presume the bias of the Ohio judiciary, but rather would consider
such a possibility only if and when the parties raised this issue on
appeal.21 3 In my view, lower federal courts should have similar
discretion to cull their dockets of "Controversies" involving state
law.
I should emphasize that my argument rests on Article III's
text and general principles of federalism. I am not contending
that the Framers explicitly endorsed judicial discretion to decline
jurisdiction (although such discretion may have been implicit, as
David Shapiro has maintained). 214 Rather, I am saying that if such
discretion becomes a practical necessity, federalism suggests it
211. Id. at 494-97.
212. Id. at 497-505.
213. Id. at 500-01. Of course, proving state court bias or wrongdoing is exceedingly
difficult. See Fitzgerald, supra note 73, at 93-99. Moreover, the odds against obtaining
certiorari have become lottery-like. The Court has thus effectively asserted discretion to
wash its hands of all jurisdiction, original and appellate, over disputes involving state
parties.
214. See Shapiro, supra note 11. The existence of such implied discretion seems especially
likely as to "Controversies," because the early Court carved many limitations on that
jurisdiction. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Professor
Holt has claimed that the Framers and Ratifiers considered diversity to be the most
important head ofjurisdiction. See Wythe Holt, "To EstablishJustice" Politics,the Judiciary
Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421. From this
historical perspective, federal courts should be particularly reluctant to decline diversity
jurisdiction. I disagree with Holt's conclusion, however, for reasons set forth in Pushaw,

supra note 99, at 508-09 n.296 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, I would add that history cannot provide the definitive answer to the problem
of jurisdictional discretion, for the simple reason that the Framers could not have imagined
that state judges would ever apply federal law more vigorously than federal courts. See
Pushaw, supranote 98, at 880 n. 141. The Framers' concern was exactly the opposite: reining
in state courts that defied federal law. See supra notes 104-05, 109-14, 149-55 and
accompanying text. A recurring theme of the Convention and ratification debates was that
states (abetted by their courts) might thwart national laws, as they had before the
Constitution was ratified. See supranotes 104-14 and accompanying text. The Constitution,
especially Article III and the Supremacy Clause, was designed to rectify the problem of state
courts refusing to apply federal law. One searches the historical record in vain for any
evidence that the Framers thought, much less feared, that state courts would be more
hospitable to federal law claims than federal courts.
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should be exercised to enable federal courts to hear more cases
involving federal (especially constitutional) law. This goal can be
achieved by commensurately reducing the number of state-law
"Controversies," which can appropriately be decided by state courts.
The Court's current approach-reflected in all its doctrines of
restraint-cuts out jurisdiction over federal question "Cases" while
leaving state law "Controversies" untouched, thereby turning
judicial federalism on its head.
In short, these jurisdictional doctrines should be revised to
increase the adjudication of federal constitutional cases. I will now
offer some tentative thoughts about how each particular doctrine
might be reworked.
A. Justiciability
The Court's stringent justiciability doctrines effectively leave
many federal law cases for final decision in state tribunals that
apply more lenient access rules.2 1 The Court has tried to bridge
that gap through several different approaches: dismissing the
appeal but denying preclusive effect to the state court's judgment
in subsequent federal litigation; vacating the state tribunal's
decision; and, most recently, asserting that state courts have
inflicted an "injury" on a losing defendant sufficient to confer
standing on appeal.21 6
These intellectual gymnastics would be unnecessary if the Court
candidly acknowledged that justiciability is, and always has been,
based primarily on prudential considerations rather than Article III
compulsion.2 1 7 Such discretion is not unbridled, however, but must
be guided by standards drawn from the Constitution's structure. In
reviewing state court cases that originally would have been nonjusticiable under federal law, the Court should apply two bedrock
principles of federalism.
215. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
217. Indeed, I would go further and abolish the modern justiciability doctrines, which
improperly deny the federal district and circuit court access granted by Congress. Rather,
the Court should return to the true original understanding by accepting all statutory
standing and exercising all federal question jurisdiction, unless requested to render formal
advisory opinions, judgments reviewable by the political branches, or decisions on political
questions. See Pushaw, supra note 12, at 397-99, 454-512.
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First, state courts exercise "judicial power" as part of autonomous
governments possessing general jurisdiction over all subjects that
the Constitution does not withdraw from them. 21' Therefore, state
tribunals can apply their own justiciability rules to any cases within
their jurisdiction, including those involving federal law, except in
those limited instances where Congress has made federal jurisdiction exclusive.2 19 If state courts adjudicate federal questions that
would have been non-justiciable in federal courts, however, they
should be limited to applying existing federal substantive law. 220 A
state court's control over its justiciability doctrines does not, and
should not, carry with it power to create novel federal (particularly
constitutional) law.
Second, the Supreme Court must be available, in the last resort,
to ensure the supremacy and uniformity of federal law.2 2 ' Thus, the
Court must have the power to review any state judicial decision
based on substantive federal law, even one rendered where federal
justiciability rules would have warranted dismissal. As a practical
matter, such appellate jurisdiction would typically be unnecessary
if state judges adhered to my proposed limit of faithfully applying
existing federal substantive law.
In short, my suggested approach would appropriately balance the
autonomy of state judiciaries against the Court's special role in
superintending federal law. Far from being a wild-eyed academic
scheme, my proposal has a distinguished historical pedigree.
Before Justice Frankfurter transformed the justiciability
doctrines into Article III jurisdictional requirements, the Court
considered them to be matters of equitable discretion and sound
judicial self-governance guided by a mix of constitutional and

218. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 22-25, 34-35, 148, 167-73 and accompanying text.
220. In other words, a federal court located in the same jurisdiction, or a higher federal
appellate court, must have already interpreted the federal law at issue. I recognize that it
is sometimes difficult to distinguish between "existing" and "new" law, especially given that
courts strive to present doctrinal innovations as consistent with precedent. Nevertheless, I
do not think that such line-drawing is impossible. For example, the Court has successfully
reined in federal judges who had been creating novel rules of constitutional law in habeas
petitions by restricting them to considering only rights extant at the time of conviction. See
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). For a good summary of Teague and its progeny, see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, at 896-905.
221. See supra notes 29, 39, 73, 124-27, 151-52, 155, 157-66 and accompanying text.
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2 23
pragmatic considerations.2 2 2 For example, in Leser v. Garnett,
Justice Brandeis followed precedent in holding that standing to
appeal to the Supreme Court existed simply because a state court
had decided a federal constitutional issue in a citizen suit authorized by state law.2 24 It did not matter that if the same plaintiff had
brought the identical constitutional claim in federal court based
merely on his status as a United States citizen, he would lack
225
standing (both originally and on appeal) under federal standards.
Similarly, in Coleman v. Miller,22 6 Kansas courts granted standing
to state legislators who had voted against a federal constitutional
amendment in 1938 and who claimed that their legislature's
procedures for ratifying it failed to comply with Article V of the
Constitution.22 7 On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld standing on
the ground that the plaintiffs "ha[d] an interest in the controversy
which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertainingand
deciding the federal questions, [was] sufficient to give the Court
jurisdiction to review that decision. ' '228 The Court stressed the need
222. The most comprehensive historical treatment of the Court's transformation of
justiciability (especially standing) from a prudential to a constitutional doctrine is Winter,
supra note 119. He built upon the work of Professors Jaffe and Berger. See Berger, supra
note 118; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure JudicialReview: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 1265 (1961).
223. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
224. Id. at 137 (accepting a Maryland law authorizing suit by a qualified voter to challenge
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment as a basis for standing on appeal to the Supreme
Court); see also Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (exercising appellate jurisdiction after
an Ohio court determined that a citizen had standing to contest the state's decision to submit
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to a referendum); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915) (taking review where a state law gave a taxpayer standing and the state court rejected
the plaintiffis federal constitutional challenge). The Court continued to follow this approach
in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), by asserting appellate jurisdiction where a
Minnesota law had allowed a citizen/taxpayer to bring a constitutional challenge to a state
statute establishing congressional districts.
225. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) (rejecting the standing of a plaintiff,
suing generally as a United States citizen and taxpayer, to challenge the adoption of the
Nineteenth Amendment). Fairchild was decided on the same day as Leser, and Justice
Brandeis wrote the Court's opinion in both cases. Hence, the only material difference was the
status of plaintiffs as state or U.S. citizens.
226. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
227. They argued that the amendment had not been ratified within a reasonable time
after its proposal in 1924, and had lost its vitality because the Kansas legislature had

rejected it in 1925. Id. at 435-36.
228. Id. at 446 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Hughes wrote an opinion, joined in its
entirety by two other Justices, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing but that the case
presented political questions. Id. at 434-56. The two dissenting Justices agreed with the
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to preserve its "opportunity ...
for the review of the decisions of
state courts on constitutional questions however the state court
'
might decide them."229
The approach in cases like Leser and Coleman expresses the
fundamental precept of judicial federalism that the Supreme Court
must be able to review litigated state cases deciding federal law
issues. By contrast, the modern Court has struggled to fulfill this
role by distorting its justiciability rules.
B. Adequate and Independent State Grounds
The foregoing principles suggest that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine should be abolished.2 3' To maintain the
plurality that the legislators had standing, but disagreed with its holding (joined by four
concurring Justices) that the case raised political questions. Id. at 470-74 (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 443 (plurality opinion) (Hughes, C.J.). The Court emphasized that the
legislators had a "direct" and "adequate" legal interest in assuring the effectiveness of their
votes, regardless of whether they had suffered any private injury. Id. at 438, 445-46.
In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter recognized Kansas's right to apply its own
justiciability rules and to create new, individualized legal interests (e.g., taxpayer suits) that
might "affordo adequate standing for review of state decisions when so recognized by state
courts." Id. at 462-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He stressed, however, that no state could
define the authority of federal courts, which were limited by Article III to the exclusive
business of deciding concrete disputes between parties with traditional, private law interests
at stake. Id. at 460-70. Because Justice Frankfurter deemed standing a matter of
constitutional federal jurisdiction, he rejected the majority's ruling that grants of standing
by state courts unconstrained by Article III could determine access to the Supreme Court.
Id.
In short, in Coleman five Justices adhered to the traditional view that standing was a
prudential determination that weighed a variety of factors (including the state's decision to
grant standing), that standing did not require a private injury, and that the Court should
broadly exercise its appellate jurisdiction to resolve all constitutional questions. Four
Justices, led by Frankfurter, argued that standing was an Article III requirement of
jurisdiction that turned upon the plaintiff's demonstration of private damage. This latter idea
eventually prevailed, and in my view has spawned great confusion. See supra notes 12-15,
20-40 and accompanying text.
230. For a detailed and persuasive argument supporting this position, see Matasar &
Bruch, supra note 76. Of course, eliminating the "adequate and independent state grounds"
doctrine will have a negligible practical effect in expanding the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction over state judgments based on federal law if the Court simply exercises its
current statutory discretion to deny writs of certiorari. See supra note 76. Curiously,
Congress's 1988 decision to make the Court's review entirely discretionary has had little
discernible impact on the jurisdictional doctrines that the Court developed in part to alleviate
its case load during a time of obligatory appellate jurisdiction. See supranote 32.
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supremacy and uniformity of federal law, the Supreme Court
should correct erroneous decisions on federal law rendered by state
tribunals, even if they proffer a state law basis to justify the
judgment.
In short, the Supreme Court's "states' rights" vision of federalism
has obscured what should be a clear obligation to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction over federal questions fully, regardless of
whether a state court sets forth an alternative state law ground for
the decision or applies lax justiciability rules. This modern view of
federalism has also prevented federal district judges from fulfilling
their obligation to exercise their original federal question jurisdiction, as illustrated by the abstention, well-pleaded complaint, and
state sovereign immunity doctrines.
C. Abstention
The abstention doctrines focus on one side of the federalism coin:
protecting the state courts' ability to adjudicate state law issues
that are peculiarly important or complex (such as tax and criminal
law) or that are unclear.23 1 Although that goal is worthy, so is
preserving the power of the federal judiciary to vindicate federal
constitutional rights.2 32 Abstention deprives parties of their
congressionally granted right to an initial federal forum to litigate
their constitutional claims.23 3
Particularly offensive are those forms of abstention that authorize federal courts to dismiss, rather than merely postpone,
adjudication of federal constitutional actions.2 34 But even Pullman
abstention, which purports only to delay the suit until a state court
has decided the state law questions, usually results in the plaintiffs
election to litigate the entire case in the state judicial system,

231. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text; Friedman, supra note 56, at 1223,
1226-32, 1237-43, 1246-50, 1254-56, 1272-74 (highlighting the importance of the state
interests preserved by abstention and other jurisdictional rules).
232. Put differently, federalism counsels against federal judicial interference with states
in making, executing, and adjudicating state law-unless such intervention becomes
necessary under the Supremacy Clause to vindicate countervailing federal law.
233. See supra notes 55-61, 63 and accompanying text.
234. See supranotes 46-52, 56 and accompanying text (discussingthe relevant precedent).
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because eventually returning to federal court would be so timeconsuming and expensive.23 5
Of course, the availability of Supreme Court review does provide
some relief from state court errors. Nonetheless, this protection
seems inadequate for two reasons. First, the original venue often
determines the outcome because of the importance of factfinding,
procedural determinations, and evidentiary rulings-all of which are
subject to a very deferential standard of review. Indeed, if the trial
court's identity did not matter, Congress would not have given
plaintiffs with federal constitutional claims the option of bringing
them in a federal forum. Second, the Court has reduced its annual
certiorari docket to a dozen or fewer state cases interpreting the
Constitution. 23' Especially as compared to its historical practice, the
Court does not appear to be deciding enough of these cases to
ensure the supremacy and uniformity of federal law.23 7
D. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Like the abstention doctrines, the well-pleaded complaint rule
eliminates an original federal forum for constitutional questions
and leaves the disappointed party with the long shot of obtaining
review in the Supreme Court. 38 Nothing in the words or drafting
235. See supra notes 44-45, 60-61 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court does not apply Pullman-style abstention to the exercise of diversity jurisdiction when
there is an unclear issue of state law, with a very narrow exception when the state's
sovereign prerogatives are implicated, such as significant exercises of eminent domain. See,
e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1959). In my view, the
Court again has it backwards: In "Controversies" federal courts should refer ambiguous state
laws to state courts, whereas in federal question "Cases" they should decide federal
constitutional questions despite the presence of unclear state laws.
236. See supra note 64.
237. Madison foresaw this problem from the beginning, which is why he insisted on giving
Congress discretion to establish lower federal courts. See Pushaw, supra note 99, at 486
n.200. Madison was also a member of the First Congress, which created such courts and
which gave the Supreme Court mandatory appellate jurisdiction over all state judgments
denying federal claims. See supra note 32. The original statutory scheme, and the relatively
small overall number of cases, provided some assurance of federal judicial availability to
consider all federal law issues.
This landscape has been transformed. Most pertinently, the Rehnquist Court's decision
to shrink dramatically its docket of appeals from state courts has made it increasingly
difficult to assert that the goal of uniformity is being met. See supra notes 64, 236 and
accompanying text.
238. See supranotes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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history of Article III or the general federal question jurisdiction
statute suggests that "Cases ... arising under the Constitution"
exclude those in which the constitutional issue is raised by the
defendant rather than the plaintiff." 9 Indeed, in many cases the
federal constitutional defense will be dispositive. Under classical
principles of federalism, it makes little sense to entrust such
matters to state courts, which lack the federal judiciary's independence and expertise in federal law.2 4 °
Ideally, then, the Court should get rid of the well-pleaded
complaint rule. At the very least, it should be abandoned in cases
where the federal district judge concludes that the decision will
turn on a significant question of federal constitutional law raised by
the defendant, as distinguished from a situation in which constitutional law is one of many different issues and is relatively unimportant. Alternatively, perhaps Congress could grant appellate review
as of right in the lower federal courts over state court judgments
that deny federal defenses.
E. State Sovereign Immunity
The Rehnquist Court and scholars have devoted enormous
attention to state sovereign immunity.2 4 ' I can add little to this
debate, beyond pointing out that the Court's theory of federalism
underlying sovereign immunity pervades all its doctrines of
jurisdictional restraint. Hence, the same sort of analytical problems
emerge.
Most importantly, contrary to the Court's assertions, the
Eleventh Amendment did not alter Article III federal question
jurisdiction or upend basic principles of judicial federalism.2 4 2
Therefore, federal courts should always decide cases involving a
claimed violation of constitutional rights, even (perhaps especially)
if the defendant happens to be a state. The Framers and Ratifiers
of the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment did not think they
were authorizing states to violate the Constitution and then claim

239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109-14, 149-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100-85 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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immunity, with the victim's sole remedy being prospective, nonmonetary relief against state officials.
CONCLUSION

I recommend that the Court restructure its jurisdictional
doctrines to ensure that federal judges adjudicate all cases involving federal constitutional rights, and correspondingly eliminate
as many state-law controversies as possible. I realize that this
proposal is so radical that it is unlikely to be adopted. Nonetheless,
perhaps those Justices whose main goal is to revive originalist
principles of federalism, or those who otherwise invoke history to
justify their decisions, might be interested in an approach that is
actually based on the Founders' view of the appropriate relationship
between federal and state courts.

